

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM


GO WORLD

WINTER 1995/96 NO. 75



香蝶樓

同夏也



KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

平成六年六月
深井勝

The Kiseido GET STRONG AT GO series

GET STRONG AT JOSEKI

Most books on joseki list endless variations, leaving it up to the readers to fend for themselves in applying these josekis in their games. But *Get Strong at Joseki* are a unique works: not only do they list the basic josekis that are most likely to arise in your games, it also shows you which joseki to select and the important follow-up moves to play in the middle game.

Each volume begins with a brief survey of the basic josekis. This is followed by more than 170 problems dealing with joseki variations, how to choose the right joseki, and how to play after the joseki. Included are new josekis with explanations telling the reader why the old josekis have been discarded.

This problem format is the ideal way to study josekis. Instead of just memorizing variations, your attention is focused on the important moves and concepts of a joseki. Memorization then comes effortlessly, making *Get Strong at Joseki* the perfect joseki books for all players. If you diligently study these three volumes, your feel for joseki will be that of a dan player.

Get Strong at Joseki 1, covers the josekis starting from the 3-4 point. **Get Strong at Joseki 2**, covers the josekis starting from the 5-3 and 5-4 points. **Get Strong at Joseki 3**, covers the josekis starting from the 4-4 point (April 1996).

US price: \$12 each volume (plus \$2.25 s/h)

GET STRONG AT INVADING

Invading is an important technique that every go player should have in his arsenal, and here is a book that will raise your invading ability to expert strength. The material is presented in problem format. Each problem is part of a series of problems in which various lines are explored. Short sequences of moves allow the reader to concentrate on one particular aspect of a problem without becoming confused through the analysis of complicated variations. This book contains 171 problems and is divided into three parts: Part one

systematically deals with the standard invasions on the side, Part Two with invading the corners and attacking corner enclosures, and Part Three with erasing territorial frameworks.

This is a book for players of all strengths. If you are a weak kyu-player, it is guaranteed to increase your invading ability by as much as six stones. If you already are a strong dan player, it will fill in the gaps that may exist in your invasion technique. A book no serious go player can do without. Now available. US price \$10 (plus \$2.25 s/h)

Other books in preparation:

Introduction to Go Tactics and Strategy
Get Strong at Fuseki (April 1996)

Get Strong at Handicap Go
Get Strong at Ko

Order from:

North America: **Kiseido**, 454 Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, CA 94903-3618 Tel: 415-499-1543; e-mail: kiseido@crl.com

Europe: **Shaak en Gowinkel het Paard**, Haarlemmerdijk 147, 1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland; Tel: +31-20-624-1171; FAX: +31-20-627-0885

Direct from Japan: **Kiseido Publishing Company**, CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan; FAX +81-467-57-3066; e-mail: SGT00076@niftyserve.of.jp

VISA and MC accepted. Include number and expiry date with your order.

CONTENTS

Go World News	2
The 18th Kukgi Title Match	6
1995 All-China Individual Championship: The Final of the Men's Division	7
Letters to the Editor	8
 The 20th Meijin Title Match: Kobayashi Koichi vs. Takemiya Masaki	11
Game One	12
Game Two	14
Game Three	21
Game Four	28
Game Five	34
 New Moves and New Josekis	41
The 20th Gosei Title Match: Game Five (Rin Kaiho vs. Kobayashi Satoru)	45
 Go Proverbs That Are Always True	52
An Introduction to Tesuji (iv)	57
Important Stones and Useless Stones	57
An Introduction to Tesuji (iv): Answers	58
Important Stones and Useless Stones (Answer)	61

Cover: A stained-glass version of an ukiyo-e print by Fukai Katsuo. (See article on page 8 for details.)

Go World is published by Kiseido Publishing Company, CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan.
Editor: Richard Bozulich

North American subscribers, order from:
Kiseido Publishing Company
454 Las Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, CA
ZIP: 94903-3618; Tel: 415-499-1543;
e-mail: kiseido@crl.com
US\$24 per year; single copy: US\$7

European subscribers, order from:
Schaak en Gowinkel het Paard
Haarlemmerdijk 147
1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland
Tel: +31-20-624-1171; FAX: +31-20-627-0885
Price: f12.50 (Dutch guilders) per issue

GO WORLD (ISSN 0286-0376) is published quarterly for \$24.00 per year by Kiseido, 454 Las Gallinas Avenue, #255, San Rafael, CA 94903-3618. Second-class postage paid at San Rafael, CA.
POSTMASTER: Send change of address orders to GO WORLD, c/o Kiseido, 454 Las Gallinas Avenue, #255, San Rafael, CA 94903-3618.

Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

© Copyright 1996 by Kiseido Publishing Company (ISSN 0286-0376). Printed in Japan.

All rights reserved according to international law. This magazine or any parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher.

Go World News

News from Japan

The 43rd Oza Title Match

O Rissei Wins His First Big Title

On September 14, O Rissei became the challenger for the Oza title by defeating Kobayashi Koichi in the final round of the main tournament. In spite of being one of the top players of the younger generation in Japan, until now O Rissei had never challenged for a major title. However, after years of good results, it was inevitable that his day would come.

There was no doubt that O would be a major threat to the title holder Cho Chikun. Of the 19 games that the two of them have played since 1981, O has won nine. However, O won the two games they played this year (in the Meijin league and the Judan tournament), so it seemed that the momentum was with him. Still, nobody expected that O would win the title with three straight wins — more resistance was expected from Cho. It is true that in each of the games Cho established an early lead, but he then let his advantage slip.

With this victory, O became the fourth player of the new generation — along with Ryu Shikun, Kobayashi Satoru, and Yoda Norimoto—to take a major title within the span of a year.

The 21st Tengen Title Match

Ryu Shikun Defends the Title

Ryu Shikun has successfully defended the Tengen title which he won from Rin Kaiho last year. This time his opponent was Kobayashi Koichi. Kobayashi, who lost his only remaining title a week before this match began (see page 11 for a full report on the Meijin title match), was undoubtedly hungry to get back into the ranks of title holders.

The first game was played on November 1, 1995, and Ryu, playing Black, won by 1 1/2 points. But Kobayashi came back strong, winning the second game by resignation and the third game by a comfortable margin of 4 1/2 points. Having put Ryu to *kadoban* in this best-of-five match, it now seemed that Kobayashi's chances of rejoining the ranks of the title holders were very good. But it was not to be. Ryu



O Rissei wins his first big title. Cho Chikun (on the left) doesn't look too happy about the result



Cho seems to be explaining something to Kato Masao in the post game discussion after he earned the right to challenge Kobayashi Satoru in the best-of-three playoff.

won the fourth game (by 3 1/2 points) and eked out a win by just half a point to win the fifth game and defend the title.



Ryu Shikun makes his first successful defense of the Tengen title.

If Kobayashi, the leading player in Japan over the last ten years, is in a slump, Ryu is in great form. With one title now firmly under his belt, he has a good chance to become Judan challenger (he needs only two more wins). He has also started off his debut in the Honinbo league with two wins. But whatever happens, there seems little doubt that Ryu will be

among the main go powers in Japan.

Cho Chikun Becomes Kisei Challenger

Eight months after losing his Kisei title to Kobayashi Satoru and two weeks after losing his Oza title, Cho Chikun has fought his way back to become the challenger for the Kisei title by defeating Kato Masao two games straight in the best-of-three playoff to decide the challenger. Kato, who belongs to the older generation of players, seems to be an easy opponent for Cho. Cho took the 1994 Oza title from Kato, rebuffed him when he became the challenger for the Honinbo title this spring, and now quickly dispatched him in this playoff. Kobayashi Kisei had better watch out: Cho has never lost as a challenger for a best-of-seven title.

The 34th Judan Tournament

The tournament to decide the challenger for the Judan title is well under way. Kobayashi Satoru and Ryu Shikun are the only players who have not suffered any losses. They are scheduled to play each other on January 5. The loser of that game, however, still has a chance to become the challenger if he can survive the losers' tournament.

Players still remaining in the losers' tournament are O Rissei, Kataoka Satoshi, Otake Hideo, and Kobayashi Koichi.

The 51st Honinbo League. Title Holder: Cho Chikun (as of 96/1/9)

Rank		KM	YS	OR	YK	RS	MG	KS	NH	Won	Lost
1	Kato Masao					●		○		1	1
2	Yuki Satoshi					●		○		1	1
3	O Rissei				●		○		●	1	2
4	Yo Kagen			○			○		○	3	0
5	Ryu Shikun	○	○					●		2	1
5	Miyazawa Goro			●	●				○	1	2
5	Kataoka Satoshi	●	●			○				1	2
5	Nakano Hironari			○	●		●			1	2

The 51st Honinbo League

This year's Honinbo league is well under way. At the moment, the front runner is Yo Kagen with three wins and no losses. Last year, Yo was in contention to become the challenger throughout the league, but he faded at the very end. Perhaps this year will be different, but he will have to expect strong challenges from Ryu Shikun and Yuki Satoshi, who just missed out becoming the challenger by losing to Kato in last year's playoff. Whatever happens, there seems to be a good chance that one of these three will prevail and that a player in his mid-20's will be challenging Cho Chikun next May.

The 21st Meijin League

The league to determine the challenger for the Meijin title has just begun. All the players have played one game each. The most noteworthy game was the one between Kobayashi Koichi, the recently dethroned Meijin, and Cho Chikun, which Kobayashi won by 1 1/2 points. There seems to be little doubt that Kobayashi is determined to become the challenger and take back the title that he held for seven consecutive terms.

There are two newcomers to the league: Yoda Norimoto and Kudo Norio. O Meien fought his way back into the league after losing his place in the previous one.

The 21st Meijin League. Title Holder: Takemiya Masaki (as of 96/1/9)

Rank		KK	OR	CC	KM	KS	RK	YN	KN	OM	Won	Lost
1	Kobayashi Koichi			○							1	0
2	O Rissei								○		1	0
3	Cho Chikun	●									0	1
4	Kato Masao									○	1	0
5	Kataoka Satoshi										0	0
6	Rin Kaiho							○			1	0
7	Yoda Norimoto						●				0	1
7	Kudo Norio		●								0	1
7	O Meien				●						0	1

International Tournaments

The 10th Japan–China Super Go Series

This year's China–Japan Super Go series is turning into rout for the Japanese. One player, Chang Hao, a lowly 19-year-old 7-dan, has wiped out nearly the entire male contingent of the Japanese team. In the last issue of *Go World* we reported that Kobayashi Satoru, the current Japanese Kisei, Rin Kaiho, and Otake were the only remaining players left to face the Chinese.

The sixth and seventh rounds were held at the Nihon Ki-in's headquarters in Tokyo on September 3 and 5. In those two rounds Chang forced both Kobayashi and Rin to resign.

Only Otake is left to save the honor of the Japanese side, and in the eighth round, held in Beijing on December 26, he got off to a good start by defeating Chang. Then two days later he beat Yu Bin 9-dan. He now faces the formidable task of defeating four of China's strongest players: Cao Dayuan, Liu Xiaoguang, Ma Xiaochun, and Nie Weiping. If Otake can pull this off it will be a crowning achievement of a brilliant go career.

The tenth and eleventh rounds are scheduled to be played at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo at the end of January.

The 7th Tong Yang Securities Cup

On November 25, 1995, the quarterfinals for the 7th Tong Yang Securities Cup World Championship were held in Seoul at the Lotte hotel. Four games were played. The results were: Ma Xiaochun beat Kobayashi Satoru, Cho Hun-hyun beat Kataoka Satoshi, Cho Chikun beat Nie Weiping, and Lee Chang-ho beat Liu Xiaoguang.

The semifinals, to be held from January 22 in Beijing, will consist of two best-of-three matches, with Lee Chang-ho playing Cho Chikun and Cho Hun-hyun playing Ma Xiaochun. The winners of these two matches will meet in the final and play a best-of-five match for a prize of 100,000,000 Korean Won (about \$130,000).

The 4th Jinro Cup Gets Under Way

The prize money has been increased to \$200,000 for the 4th Jinro Cup World Champi-

onship (formerly called the Jinro Cup: the SBS World Championship — SBS seems to have been removed from the name, but this Seoul TV station remains the main organizer). The Jinro Cup is a knockout tournament between five-player teams from Japan, China, and Korea that so far has been monopolized by Korea. (Reports on previous tournaments are given in GW69, 70, and 73.)

A feature of this tournament is a bonus system for successive wins, but we are not sure when it was instituted. Anyway, this time three wins in a row will earn a bonus of \$10,000; the bonus increases to \$80,000 for ten wins in a row (which means one player defeating all the players in the other two teams). However, the top prize has already been ruled out.

The opening rounds were played in Tokyo in early December 1995. Results to date:

Chu Kyu-byong 7-dan (Korea) beat Luo Xihe 5-dan (China), but lost to Morita Michihiro 8-dan (Japan), who then lost to Chen Linxin 9-dan (China). Chen also defeated Yang Jae-ho 9-dan (Korea) and Miyazawa Goro 9-dan (Japan), thus earning a bonus. He then lost to Yoo Chang-hyuk 6-dan (Korea).

News From Korea

Lee Chang-ho continued his domination of the Korean titles in the last part of 1995. This summer he defended the Myungin (Meijin) title against Yang Jae-ho 9-dan. Lee has now held this title for five consecutive terms. Then in September he rebuffed a challenge by Cho Hun-hyun in the 39th Kuksoo title by defeating him three games to one in this best-of-five match.

Last September Lee also played a best-three-match with Ryu Shikun, who is the Japanese Tengen. Both Lee and Ryu were *insei* at the Korean Ki-in, and during this time a friendly rivalry developed between them. Lee won the match by winning the first two games.

Cho Hun-hyun, who once dominated the Korean tournament scene, was left without a title when he lost his Daewang (Great King) title to Lee Chang-ho last February. He finally regained a crown by defeating Seo Bong-soo 3-0 in the 12th Bacchus Cup last September.

The 18th Kukgi Title Match: Game One

Yoo Chang-hyuk 7-dan is challenging Lee Chang-ho for the 18th Kukgi title. If Lee can successfully defend it, he will have won 16 consecutive title matches. At present Lee, who is referred to as a 'tank with a broken brake', holds 12 Korean titles. Here is the first game from the title match

White: Yoo Chang-hyuk 6-dan

Black: Lee Chang-ho 7-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 4 hours each

Played on November 2, 1995 at the Korean Go Association




Figure 1 (1—76)

Figure 1 (1—76)

White should have played 36 at A. Black invades at 37, and a fierce fight breaks out on the lower side. When Black takes the vital point at 53, the game is starting to favor Black.

White 54 is an all-out move, but Black 55 and 57 are powerful counters. Still, Black should have played 55 at B, followed by White C and Black D.

White 60 is greedy; he should have simply retreated to 62. From Black 63 to 75, Black has profited from the fight, so the position is promising for Black.

Figure 2 (77-160)

Black 81 is a thick move.

White 104 is lukewarm: it should have played in the upper left corner. By 113, Black is clearly ahead.




Figure 2 (77-160)
158: connects (at 151)




Figure 3 (161-203)

Figure 3 (161-203)

White struggles on with 64 and 66, but Black 75 is an accurate response. Black's victory is complete.

(NHK Igo Koza, January 1996. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

News from China

Ma and Nie Play a Three-Game Match

From September 23 to 25, 1995, Nie Weiping and Ma Xiaochun played a special three-game match. Ma won the match 2-1.

1995 All-China Individual Championship The Final of the Men's Division

Every year around September the All-China Individual Championship is held. This year the venue was in Guangzhou (the capital of Guangdong Province). This championship is not supported by any private company or newspaper; rather, it is held as a public event by the government. Men and women customarily play in separate tournaments. The men who place first and second in the men's division gain the right to participate in the Fujitsu World Cup. The rankings of the women in the other division is used for determining which women will play in which tournaments in China.

This year the popular 19-year-old Chang Hao 7-dan won the men's tournament for the first time. Chang is the player who wiped out nearly the entire Japanese team in the China-Japan Super Go series. His opponent in the final was the 28-year-old Yu Bin.

White: Chang Hao 7-dan

Black: Yu Bin 9-dan

Played in Guangzhou on September 24, 1995

Figure 1 (1—58)

According to Chang playing White 24 at 31 might have been better.

Black 25 is severe. Instead of White 26, playing at 31 would be a safe way locally, but this group lacks of eyes, so it would become insecure. Playing White 26 at 29, aiming to sacrifice it and get sente to take care of this group, would be safer. But the loss would be too big, so this alternative is unattractive.

Black 31 and 33 are strong moves. White would like to make a *ponnuki* at 39 instead of playing White 34, but Black 36 would be sente against the white group below, so this is not good.

Black 41 is a calm move, waiting to see how White is going to capture the black stones. Up to 54, White has captured the four black stones, but the black thickness is unbelievably huge.

The mistake at Black 55 is played quickly, but it is an important one. Black should have thrown in at 56 so that White would have to answer Black 55 with White A. Then Black B would become a forcing move. There is a big

difference between these moves and the ones in the game in terms of thickness and ko threats.

Black 57 stresses thickness, but Black C would be the usual move.




Figure 1 (1—58)

Figure 2 (59-118)

Black 83 at A is usual, but White 90 would follow, and Black's shape is not exactly working well. Playing White 88 at 90 would provoke a severe cut at Black B. White 88 is a flexible move.

Instead of 115, it might have been better for Black to have retreated to C. White now launches a ferocious attack against these black stones with 116 and the following.




Figure 2 (59-118)

69, 72, 75: ko around 61; 87: connects at 80




Figure 3 (119-204)

65, 70: ko around 62; 72: connects (left of 62)

Figure 3 (119-204)

Attacking the stones on the left step by step with 130 and 132 is Chang's style. After

this, no brilliant moves by White occur, but the flow of the game is naturally tilting towards White. According to Chang's whole-board assessment, unless Black wins the ko fight around 162, he cannot win the game. This was a reasonable assessment.

White wins by resignation.

(NHK Igo Koza, December 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

The Cover

The cover picture is a stained-glass version of a Kunisada ukiyoe print by Fukai Katsuo. Mr. Fukai is an amateur 5-dan go player who took up stained glass as a hobby when he retired 11 years ago. From June 19 to 24, 1995 he held an exhibition of 22 works with a go theme at an art gallery in the Ginza. As far as we know, these are the only stained-glass art works depicting go. Usually it takes Mr. Fukai about three months to finish one work

Letters to the Editor

The AGA and the Ing Rules

In *Go World* #72, in an article by Ing Chang-ki (p.12), Mr. Ing declared that 'the American Go Journal also criticized the [Nihon Ki-in] rules as unreasonable.' This statement is misleading and requires clarification.

Mr. Ing's translator informs us that this statement refers to an article by William Mann in the Jan.-Feb. 1976 issue of the AGJ (11:1). Mr. Mann's article compared the Nihon Ki-in rules to the 'SST Laws of Wei-ch'i', which had recently been introduced by Mr. Ing. While admiring the SST Laws' 'elegance', he found the requirement that each player have exactly 180 stones to be an 'insuperable obstacle' to widespread acceptance. On balance Mr. Mann found the Nihon Ki-in rules 'simple, fair and traditional' and therefore preferable, and went on to suggest some modifications of the Nihon Ki-in rules. The word 'unreasonable' does not appear in the article.

Mr. Mann's personal opinions did not and do not represent any AGA position on the Ing

rules or any other rule system. Please note also that the Japanese rules have been modified since this article was published almost twenty years ago, and many admittedly arbitrary conventions have been removed.

The AGA does not consider the Japanese rules to be either 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable'. As an association of amateur and generally weak players, we do not consider ourselves qualified to judge the relative merits of rules systems. We support the International Go Federation's Rules Committee's position that several workable sets of rules exist. We use different rules systems, including the Japanese rules, the 'SST Laws of Goe', and our own 'Simplified Rules of Go', at different times for different purposes.

In fact, with the help of generous sponsorship from the Ing Foundation, we have been conducting a trial of the 'SST Laws of Goe' at tournaments all over the US. Thus far our experience has been highly satisfactory. But we have not judged any rule system to be superior to the others. We can only say how

well a rules system works for amateurs, but we do not consider ourselves qualified to make the global judgment of which systems are more reasonable than others. We must leave that judgment to the professionals.

Phil Straus, AGA President

Roy Laird, AGA Publications Coordinator

Invention or Evolution?

Recently several articles have appeared on the origin of go. If obfuscation of the subject is their purpose they may have some success. Otherwise the sum of the remarks are just so much codswollop. One of the ideas: 'Go is said to have been invented 4,000 years ago in India, from where it spread to China.' The first problem with this statement is the idea of 'invention'. Because 'who invented or who created go' is the wrong question, it has given rise for the last two thousand years or so to the wrong answer. The correct question is 'How did go evolve?' Rephrasing the question does away in one stroke with the idea of an inventor or creator. Similarly one is on the wrong track already when one asks, 'Who created the universe?' One will come quicker to the answer if one asks, 'How did the universe evolve?' Does it always expand for ever and ever? Does it always expand and contract in a never-ending cycle?' To ask about a creator tests credulity and undermines faith. It is contrary to every principal of inductive logic. To get to the right question about go, we must rid our minds not only of cant but of the very idea of invention! Go evolved. It was not invented.

We can see evidence of the evolution of go some three thousand years ago in China, but certainly not in India or in Tibet. There are references to go in the fourth and fifth century B.C. Chinese classics, but demonstrably not in the Upanishads or in Tibetan sutras.

In the history of man technological progress advanced not by leaps and bounds, but by slow evolution. Go probably took a thousand years or more to evolve. It took some three million yeras for the wheel to evolve in the society of 'clever man'. What if we were to compare go with the evolution, for example, of something with even more permutations,

the piano. Looking at such a marvelous and complicated instrument, it is natural to ask. 'Who invented it?' But was it invented? From the eleventh to the seventeenth centruy there were numerous stringed instruments fitted with keys (*clavis*), including the clavichord, preferred by J. S. Bach, and the harpsichord. On the former a player could control, to a degree, volume. But even so the sound was too light, and could not be heard above another intrument or singer. The harpsichord, though richer, more sonorous, and much louder than a clavichord, had little dynamic variation. Cristofori (1655–1731) combined the percussive action of the clavichord with the construction, case, and sound board of the harpsichord, and a four and a half foot keyboard. He called it a *clavichord col piano e forte*, a 'soft and loud harpsichord'. His principal contribution was a hammer action which would leave the string and not damper its vibration. Did he invent the piano? He invented the action which transformed the harpsichord into a piano. So he is called its inventor. However, today's huge, cast-iron-framed king of intruments with 144 strings is a far cry from man's first stringed instrument, the simple bow, or even Cristofori's effort.

All string instruments evolved from a youthful warrior's discovery that a thong stretched between the ends of a strong, flexible stick will propel with more accuracy and greater force than his naked arm another sharpened stick into the eye or mouth of his enemy. Afterwards he could pluck the thong again and evoke a pleasant sound and memory. Like the wheel, the bow probably took some three million years to work out. It is a very simple idea, but nonetheless the origin of all string instruments, including the piano.

Technological advances, whether the spoked wheel, the piano, or a game like go, have all evolved over thousands and in some cases millions of years. Most likely, yea, even the universe was not invented but evolved and indeed continues to evolve so that god be not mocked.


Donald Potter

Palm Beach, Australia


Ten Easy Problems

In each of the problems below Black's task is to capture some key white stones. A dan-level player should be able to see the tesuji to solve these problems at a glance, but if your level is in the mid-kyus, you might have to think a bit before you find the tesuji. Answers are on page 64.


Black to play in all problems




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3




Problem 4




Problem 5




Problem 6




Problem 7



Problem 8



Problem 9



Problem 10

The 20th Meijin Title Match


Kobayashi vs. Takemiya

Lucky Takemiya

by Otake Hideo

Before this match started, I thought Takemiya had a slight edge. He was lucky to become the challenger and did so after trailing the leader, Cho Chikun, through most of the league. His eventual triumph was up in the air until the very last game. He must have been elated to have emerged the victor. I thought such a positive feeling would be an important psychological factor.

On the other hand, Kobayashi's invincibility has begun to wane a bit. Moreover, a desire to hang on to his only remaining title must have put additional pressure on him. For these reasons, I thought Takemiya had a slight advantage going into the series.




Game One: Kobayashi (White) vs. Takemiya

While watching the first game, however, I got the opposite feeling. Kobayashi seemed to be relaxed, and Takemiya looked too eager. For example, I can't believe Takemiya played Black 2 in *Game One*. Considering Takemiya's 'cosmic' style of go, his first instinct should have been to play this move at 'a'. This indicated to me that Takemiya was tense.

The first game was filled with the kind of moves that have established Kobayashi as one of the great players of his generation. However, he made an unbelievable mistake in the endgame and lost. Since Kobayashi has a reputation of always winning a won game, it was an ominous sign for the outcome of this title match.

Takemiya, was lucky to win the first game. His victory must have affected his attitude in the second because I could sense that he was no longer overly eager.



Game Two: Takemiya (White) vs. Kobayashi

For example, White 2 in *Game Two* showed great restraint. Even though this move is gote, it makes good shape, is very thick, and relies on using this thickness later in the game to make profit. Kobayashi replied with the quick-paced moves of Black 3, 5, and 7, typical of his style. Takemiya then played White 8, another slow move, but one which contained many good ideas.

Just as in the first game, Kobayashi had a chance to win, but the tide changed at the very end, and Takemiya again pulled off a lucky half-point win. Still, in terms of the quality of Takemiya's play, the second game was superior to the first.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Black: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on September 6–7, 1995, in Nagoya.

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1–68)

Figure 1 (1–68). Not like Takemiya

In this game Takemiya seemed too eager to win. When White jumped to 48, it was no longer Takemiya's game. He himself must have been dissatisfied with it.




Dia. 1

Instead of Black 21, Takemiya usually plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. This way Black's stones around the board are able to integrate as one. As Black, Takemiya always had a special skill

at playing this kind of large-scale game.

Kobayashi, on the other hand, has his own special skills. He invaded at 22 early in this fuseki. Exchanging White 24–Black 25 is also characteristic of Kobayashi's style. Most professionals would usually play at 26 or B instead, without making this exchange. The problem with it is that it reduces White's corner territory.

After 41, Black can later create a seki there, reducing it to zero points with the sequence from Black 1 to 11 in Dia. 2. Before Black 5, if White plays at 5, then he can get six points there. The odds of reaching either of these results are 50–50. Hence, this territory is worth no more than three points.



Dia. 2

Dia. 3

If White did not play the exchange of White 24–Black 25, he could get at least five points as in Dia. 3. (In Dia. 2, if White played 4 at 8, Black would attack it with 6, White 11, and Black 9. This would lead to a one-step approach-move ko). Of course, Kobayashi was aware of all these variations.

Instead of 45, Black should have capped at A. Black 45 let White jump to 48, erasing Black's moyo. From the moves 49 on, Black must have started feeling uncomfortable, perhaps scolding himself not to make the same mistake again.

With 38 and 48, the game is gravitating in Kobayashi's favor. White 68 and the following moves are also brilliant.

Figure 2 (69–100). Kobayashi's corner play is beyond reproach.

In situations such as the bottom right corner, Kobayashi usually plays astute moves. However, I question his decision not to answer Black 91.

White invades at the 3–3 point with 68, then after Black answers with 69, he invades again at 70. These moves are examples of

Kobayashi's flexibility and inventiveness. However Black responds to 70, the exchange of White 68 for Black 69 has made it a strong forcing move.





Figure 2 (69-100)

Takemiya must have put a lot of thought into Black 71. An ordinary answer with Black 1 in *Dia. 4* would lead to the sequence to White 14. This result for White would be too good for Black to allow. Indeed, the marked white stone has worked very well.



Dia. 4

Dia. 5

White 72 is a shrewd response to Black 71. If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 5* to separate the white stones, White would make territory in the corner with the sequence to White 8. After this, connecting at Black 'a' is essential, so White would have taken the corner in sente. This would not be good for Black, so Takemiya answers at 73 even though it is not a sharp response. White is able to play both 82, which is territorially big, and 88. This is a great success for White.

However, from this point on, Kobayashi begins to make dubious moves. White 92 should be at A and White 98 and 100 make

thickness in the wrong place.





Figure 3 (101-200)
82, 85, 88: ko (over 70)

Figure 3 (101-200). Takemiya catches up.

Because White made thickness with 98 and 100 in *Figure 2*, Black moves out with 1 and 3, and the white group in the center suddenly becomes thin.

White 24 looks territorially big, but some professionals argued that it would have been better for White to play 1 in *Dia. 6* and respond to Black 2 with 3. I agree.

Dia. 6. Even though White loses some territory in the lower left corner, he gets the big point at 3 in exchange. If there are no surprises after this, White should be able to finish the game with a slight lead.



Dia. 6

Game Two





Figure 4 (201–272)
61: connects (right of 25);
72: connects (left of 66)

Figure 4 (201–272). A regrettable move

In response to Black 11, White plays 12, which becomes the losing move. Black takes three stones with 19, and White takes two stones with 24; White has lost about two points. If White had played at 1 in *Dia. 7*, he would have won by a margin of between 1/2 to 1 1/2 points.

Black wins by 1/2 point.

(Kido, November, 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)



Dia. 7

White: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on September 21–22, 1995, in Sendai.

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1–19). Kobayashi's favorite opening

With 6 and 7, both White and Black drive wedges between their opponent's opening formations, so this game becomes a mild opening. Black 17 and 19 are Kobayashi's invention.

A referee does not do much. He tells both players when to start the game. Because this was the second game, the player of the black stones was already decided, so a referee is not needed in this matter. The other things a referee does is to check the end of the game, to preserve the sealed move in an envelope (if it is a two-day game — although the envelope is put in the hotel safe), and to open that envelope. That's all.

The moves to Black 7 were played very quickly. That's because Takemiya always plays on two adjacent corner star points, regardless of whether he is playing with Black or White. Therefore, it is easy for his opponents to plan a strategy in advance against him. Is that an advantage or disadvantage? Takemiya is the type of person who never considers such things.





Figure 1 (1–19)


The moves from White 8 to Black 11 flow naturally. Kobayashi could have predicted the moves up to this point.

Instead of 12, White could play at 14. Black 15 and White A would follow. However, since White 14 would be left alone at the top, White would have to expect black attack on that stone. Since Takemiya did not like that prospect, he chose White 12.



Dia. 1

Black has another option instead of 13. he could play 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. Black 1 would get an extension from his corner enclosure in the bottom right corner, while Black 3 would prevent the development of a white moyo at the top. I would probably choose this way.



Dia. 2

Black 13 is also a good point, because it

attacks the white corner group on the left. Even if White plays 1 in Dia. 2, after Black 2, he can still aim at 'a'. Ideally, Black would like to take the points 'b' and 'c', so, Takemiya left this corner group and played White 16 after exchanging White 14 for Black 15. The difference between White A and 16 is just a matter of feeling; it is not a question of good or bad.

The combination of Black 17 and 19 is Kobayashi's invention. They are severe moves. Black is concerned with the width of White's moyo on the upper side. So even though he invades at 17, his real aim is the upper side. Black B instead of 19 would let White take the good point of 19, making a wide moyo at the top.

Figure 2 (20-35). Takemiya's dignified move

White could also play 20 at 21, but the sequence to Black 23 is natural. Some criticisms were made of White 30, but . . .

Takemiya regretted White 20. 'White 20 should be at 21,' he said. Not only did he dislike letting Black invade the top, but he also disliked having to play 30 as an additional move.






Figure 2 (20-35)

If White took the outside with 1 in Dia. 3, the result to Black 6 would be viable. But things are not that simple. In response to White 1 in Dia. 4, Black could play 2 and 4. It would also be possible to play 4 at 'a'. In any case, the moves to Black 23 flow naturally.




White 30 is an important move. Without it, Black could link up to the stones below with A–White 30–Black B. Since there are ways to get sente here, how many professionals are there who could play at 30 as an extra move?

For example, White could exchange White 1 for Black 2 in *Dia. 5*, then play 3. Alternatively, White could push at 1 in *Dia. 6*, then switch to 3. If Black now played 4, White would counter with 5 and, because of White 1, he could capture the black stones. Therefore, Black would only aim at the forcing sequence Black 6–White 4–Black 8.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White, however, patiently played 30, aiming to attack the black group at the top. I see this as a dignified move in which Takemiya stakes this game on an endgame spurt.




Figure 3 (26–58)

Figure 3 (26–58). Dubious moves


White 36 and Black 37 — I don't know whether these moves are good or bad. However, I question White 40. Is this move really possible? White's shape is unreal.

Takemiya plays very quickly, quicker than Kobayashi, who also plays relatively quickly. Takemiya ended both the first and second games without going into *byo-yomi*.

Playing fast is not a bad thing. But if there is a situation where time needs to be spent, shouldn't a player spend some time on it? I always say that a best-of-seven title match is given only to selected people, a privilege to play on the greatest stage. I just hope that Takemiya appreciates and relishes each game in this best-of-seven match.


White 36 seems to be replete with good ideas. It does not directly defend the cutting point at 40; instead, it aims at A. Therefore, Black cannot easily cut at 40. In response to White 36, if Black immediately played at 41, White would invade at B.

Black 37 urges White to defend his cutting point. A player would not think of such a move unless he is full of fighting spirit. Its meaning is to force White to connect, making his group heavy. If White immediately connected with 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black would defend at 2. If White then invaded with 3, Black would jump to 4 and the marked black stone would become a forcing move.




Dia. 7

Just obeying Black's demand that White connect would be too submissive, so Takemiya attaches with 38 to make the stone at 37 heavy. Although it is a fine idea, White 40 is an unbelievable move. The sequence from 1 to 9 in Dia. 8 looks very natural to me. The white group has eyes and is safe because of the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'. In the game, White has a weak point at C, but, in this diagram, White has played at 9. White 40 aims at 42, but Black wisely regards his two stones at 37 and 38 as light and makes territory at the bottom with Black 43.




Dia. 8



Dia. 9

In spite of these criticisms, I feel that White 52 to 58 show Takemiya's patient strategy. At first glance White 1 and 3 in Dia. 9 might be considered, but trying to create a chaotic skir-

mish in this position is not Takemiya's style. Since White separated the two black stones at 37 and 39, White might play 1 in Dia. 10 to capture them. If Black responded with 2, White would play 3 in good rhythm. But then Black might play 2 at 3.



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (59–82). An inconceivable move

In the last figure, Takemiya played some unbelievable moves, but now it was Kobayashi's turn. Black 61 is inconceivable to me.

I disagreed with some of Kobayashi's moves in this game, but I could more or less understand them. However, I could never condone Black 61. If Black wants to play in this area, it is better to play this move at 63 without Black 61. Originally, Black did not have any interest in helping these two stones. Instead, Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 11 are respectable moves. Black can now aim directly at 'c' after forcing the Black 'a'–White 'b' exchange. Black 'd' is also a good aim. In addition, Black 1 and 3 give support to the black group at the top.






Figure 4 (59–82)




Dia. 11

Now that Black 61, inducing White 62, gives White relief, White can play 70, 72, and 76, turning the tide of battle in favor of White. Black 61 definitely made Takemiya feel better. Moreover, in the moves from Black 63 to Black 77, Kobayashi did not take time to read out one variation.


After White 82, the first day's session ended and Black 83 became the sealed move.



Dia. 12




read this countermove carefully. This would never have happened when Kobayashi was at the height of his powers. It is said that he is suffering from accumulated fatigue as a tournament pro, causing him to make such mistakes.



Dia. 14

What would have happened if Black connected at 106 after White 104? Kobayashi must have been startled when he read it out. If Black connected at 1 in *Dia. 14*, White would attach with 2, severing the link-up to the black group below. In response to Black 3, one way to separate this group would be White 4. If Black 5, the sequence to White 10 would follow, and if Black cut at 'a', White would extend to 'b'. White 4 in *Dia. 15* is also possible. When White plays 8, Black can't capture these two white stones. Instead of Black 7, if Black took a white stone with 'a', the sequence White 'b'-Black 7-White 'c' would follow. This would be another big problem for Black.




Dia. 15


Therefore, Black has no choice but to attach with 105 and let White cut with 106. White 106 itself is worth 14 or 15 points. In addition, White 106 makes the entire white group safe; the effect of this is also big.

In retrospect, Black should have played 95 at 1 and 3 in *Dia 16*. Black could answer White

'a' with Black 'b' followed by Black 'c'. Black 'c' is not a small move. If this had happened, Black would have been at least seven or eight points ahead on the board.



If Black played 21 before White 20, the point A would be Black's right to play. When White cuts at 20, Black cannot connect at 22.



Dia. 17

3: plays elsewhere

White 2 in Dia. 17 would make White thick and generate profitable moves from White 4. White 12 could be at 13 as well.




Figure 7 (143-200)


53: connects above 47

Figure 7 (143-200). Kobayashi misses his chance.

The consensus in the press room was that this game was going to end in a half-point victory; but for whom? Later, the conclusion was reached that if Black plays at A and forces White to connect at B, Black wins by a half point; if White does not connect there, but

takes other points and then wins this ko fight, White would win.

Surprisingly, Kobayashi did not play at A for a long time. Instead, he erased his ko threats with Black 95, 97, 99.



Dia. 18

At 95, Black missed his chance. He should have played at 1 in Dia. 18 to erase White's ko threat and to leave the threat of Black 'a' (if White connects at 'c', Black plays at 'b'). White would play 2 and 4 for a two-point gain, and Black would atari at 5. Now White would not be able to win this ko.




Figure 8 (201-232)

24, 30: takes ko below 21; 27: takes ko at 21; 32: connect at 21

Because Black erased his ko threats, when he played at 19, White did not have to connect

at 21. White played 20 as the last point, and was finally able to connect at 32, winning this game by a half point.

Had Black played at 19 much earlier, taking stones with 21 and A would not only have been big, but it would also threaten the entire white group if he captured with B. White would have had to be very selective about his ko threats, which means that White would not have had enough ko threats to win the ko.

Did Kobayashi think that White's disregard of Black 19 would cause him to lose this game by half point? This is a mystery to me.

After the game, Takemiya said, 'I played a satisfactory game.' I guess what he meant was that even though he played some regrettable moves, unlike the first game, he was able to show his strength.

Kobayashi, on the other hand, also fully demonstrated his strength, but he missed Takemiya's counterattack even though he is a player who is painstakingly careful about countermoves. Well, a best-of-seven match allows a player to lose three games. I hope that Kobayashi will relax and go on to play the remaining five games.

White wins by 1/2 point.

(Kido, November 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

Game Three

A violent clash between two fiercely individualistic players: Takemiya drives the Meijin into a corner.

White: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Black: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on October 4–5, 1995.

The commentary on this game is taken from a live coverage at the Oni-no-Sumika hotel in Shuzenji, Izu, Shizuoka prefecture. Kobayashi Satoru Kisei did the commentary along with Akiyama Kenji, a go reporter. The game started at 9:00 a.m.

Figure 1 (1–27). *Takemiya's fuseki is a pleasure to watch.*

Akiyama Kenji: Are you often asked to be a referee or a commentator for title matches?

Kobayashi Kisei: I have never been asked to be a referee, but I have been a commentator many times. However, I'd rather be playing. This is such a nice place — I should be here as a player.




Figure 1 (1–27)

A: If you become the challenger for the Meijin title next year, you'll be able to play here.

K: Oh, no, I've already lost a game in a preliminary round, so it won't happen. The earliest I could come here for a Meijin title match is two years from now. But if I talk about such things far in the future, a devil will laugh at me and it will never happen.

A: They're playing so fast. The moves up to White 16 are exactly the same as the first game. In that game, Black played 17 at A and White answered at B.

K: Black 17 looks more like Takemiya's style. I think Black will next push at 21 and 23.

A: Black 19 and White 20 were also played in the first game.


K: If I were White, I might play 20 at 22. This move is worth trying.

A: Yes. Just as you said, Black played at 21 and 23.

K: Wow . . . White 24 is an unusual move. This is the first time I've seen a move like this in Kobayashi Meijin's game. It seems as if Takemiya's fighting spirit is stronger than Kobayashi's. Or maybe both of them are even.

A: Many stones have been placed with a two-space distance between them. How

should Black answer White 24? What about Black 1 in *Dia. 1*?



Dia. 1

K: That's the worst. Even if White plays a shoulder hit at 2, followed by the sequence to 6, Black's moyo above will be erased naturally and he will lose the game immediately. This is a place where Takemiya is going to spend some time thinking.

A: Black took twenty minutes to play 25.

K: Beautiful! I could think about this position for years and this move would never occur to me. This is why Takemiya's fuseki is so enjoyable to watch.

A: In response to White 26, Black played at 27. Oh, I see . . . a huge black moyo above is starting to form.

K: I was wondering where Fujisawa Shuko would play 25. Maybe he'd cap at 26. This is also interesting. Anyway, however you play, it takes forever to find the best move. White's next move is difficult.

A: An amateur would certainly want to play at C.





Figure 2 (28-59)

Figure 2 (28-59). A fierce invasion

K: White played at 28 and 30. I wouldn't be able to play there either.


A: Why doesn't White approach at 1 in *Dia. 2*?



Dia. 2

K: Professionals would also consider a move at White 1 first. But Black might play at 2 in *Dia. 2* and White wouldn't have a good way to make shape. White 3 seems attractive, but Black can play forcing moves from 4 to 10, then surround a white stone with 12. This would be horrible for White.

A: But I think what happened in the game doesn't look good for White either, or is it? After forcing with 32 and 34 White ended in sente.



Dia. 3

K: Well, it is sente, but Black doesn't have to play at A any more because of Black 29 and 31, so it is not unsatisfactory for Black. I think I would play Black 33. Until several years ago, Takemiya would not answer a move like White 32, but would expand his moyo with Black 1 in *Dia. 3* instead, staking the game on his moyo. In response to White 2, Black could

threaten at 'a' or could expand his moyo at 'b'. But by Black's augmenting his moyo in this way, White's aim at 'c' becomes more effective. Today, Takemiya does not depend on the center too much. Besides, Black 33 and 35 are normal moves, aren't they?


A: Now that White has sente, where does he play, B or C?

K: Those are normal moves . . . Wait! Too bad you missed it: White just played 36. Just as in the first game, Kobayashi Meijin invades Black's moyo very severely. He wants to wipe out Black's territory.

[While the Meijin was thinking about White 38, Takemiya suddenly appeared in the press room. Kobayashi Kisei, in a panic, messed up the stones, destroying the position he was discussing. They chatted for a while. When Takemiya saw White 38 on the TV monitor, he muttered to himself, 'Huh, what kind of move is that!?' and went back to the game room.]

A: We should be careful. If he accidentally saw what we were discussing, it could have had a bad affect on this game.

K: Yes, that could certainly generate bad *aji*. What I am discussing here is not going to help him, though. After Black 39, these are the moves played, aren't they? Black is not dissatisfied, is he? Wait! That's not true. Those cutting points created by White 46 seem painful for Black, so he should have played 45 at 1 in *Dia. 4*. In response to White 2 and 4, Black would connect at 5, and Black wouldn't have any cutting points. Just simply making this white group live with 'a' would be disagreeable. White might try 6 and 8, but this seems to be good for Black.



Dia. 4

[After the game, Takemiya also admitted his failure with Black 45 by saying, 'I wanted to take that move back.']

A: Is Black 53 sente?

K: Without White 58, the sequence Black 58–White D–Black E–White F–Black G would follow, and the white group would die. Yet, I don't understand White 58. I think, it is better to play at White E. There is a big difference between White 58 and White E.

K: Just as I expected, Black played 59. At first, I thought this move is good for Black. However, because of White's fierce invasion, it is not completely favorable.

[At this point, the lunch break began. Although there still was four minutes left before lunch time, the Kobayashi Meijin said, 'Please add these four minutes to my time,' and then retired to his room and ate lunch alone. Takemiya, however, ate together with those who were officiating this game. After lunch, Takemiya challenged Rin Kaiho to a game of shogi (Japanese chess) and soundly defeated him.]




Figure 3 (60-90)

Figure 3 (60-90). Kobayashi plays all the forcing moves.


K: Let's look ahead a bit and see how White might respond to the marked black stone. In *Dia. 5* Rin suggested White 1 and 3. Black may be tempted to enter the 3-3 point, but White would let Black take the corner territory, then pincer with White 9 or 'a'. This looks like a balanced game.

A: White cut at 60.

K: Wow! It looks too aggressive. But wait. Maybe it is a great move. We have to see the

follow-up moves. Black can't play carelessly now. I think Takemiya is going to spend at least two hours.

A: One hour and twelve minutes, to be exact.



Dia. 5

K: Is Black 61 the correct answer? Another option is an atari at 64, but White would simply answer at 'A'; this wouldn't be any good. Black 61 at 71 wouldn't be good either; White could play either a move towards the marked black stone to make the ladder in his favor or simply squeeze at 61. If Black plays 61 in response to White 60, White will cut at 70 and split up the black groups there. Indeed, White 60 is a wonderful move.


A: White played every forcing move he had from 62 to 68.

K: That's strange. Those forcing moves take the pressure off Black by helping him settle his stones. White should've simply played at 70 and 72 without those forcing moves, shouldn't he? But I'm not really sure about this.

A: Even though this is such a difficult situation, both players are playing their moves almost immediately. Black just played 73 without spending any time thinking.

K: Cutting at 1 in *Dia. 6* without Black 73 also seems possible. White would sever the black group on the left from the one on the right by playing 2, 4, and 6. You understand the meaning of the sequence from Black 7, don't you? After Black fills a white liberty

with 15, White 16 looks like a miracle move. Any other move loses this capturing race. Finally, Black would sacrifice all the black stones at the top and squeeze.




Dia. 6

A: Can Black afford to lose so many stones?

K: White would get 42 points at the top, but Black would get even more territory on the right side and in the center. Black could even take a wonderful point at 25. As a result, Black would be far ahead.

A: That's a surprising result.

K: I'll show you something else which may also surprise you. Instead of 78, White might play at 1 in *Dia. 7*. Black would cut at 2, and the sequence to Black 16 is inevitable.



Dia. 7

A: This time White would get sente and be able to play 17 and 19.

K: This result seems to be even. White 1 should have been considered, but Kobayashi Meijin's intention was totally different from this.

A: Which is better in the end?

K: That's what I don't see. Just exchanging White 82 and 84 implies that the Meijin may be very confident in its effect. But I couldn't play White 82. Without it, there would still be some aji, such as the sequence White 83-Black B-White C.

[When White played 86, a small earthquake occurred and Kobayashi Meijin said, 'Has the big one finally happened?']

K: White 86 is a splendid and confident move. It puts pressure on the black group to the right. I can now understand why White wanted to play 82 and 84. I knew that Kobayashi Meijin is good at a balanced strategy. Even though the black group at the bottom side is threatened, Black has to play on the left side. Isn't it about time for the sealed move?

A: Look! White played 88 and 90.

K: Kobayashi Meijin doesn't seem to like playing the sealed move.

A: Takemiya sealed the next move, so the first day is over. Where do you think Takemiya played the sealed move?

K: Black D seems to be the only move. Well, maybe Black E is also possible. Yes, Black E is a good move, too.




Figure 4 (91-110)

105: takes ko at 95; 108: takes ko (right of 95)


Figure 4 (91-110). The sealed move becomes the highlight of the game.

A: Can you tell who is ahead by looking at how the players are behaving?

K: Kobayashi Meijin seems comfortable. Takemiya, as usual, is so cheerful that I can't tell anything from his face.

A: Both players are now replaying the moves played yesterday; here is the sealed move.


K: I hate replaying the moves at the beginning of the second day. I made a mistake in one game of the Kisei title match. Wow, Black invaded at 91. Takemiya doesn't think this game is good for Black. He is saying that he will leave black stones on both the left and bottom sides to White while he takes more territory. This move seems to be the highlight of the game. Takemiya's stones are full of energy, and his ability to judge the situation is good. These are the reason why Takemiya has been doing so well recently. I don't know whether or not White 94 is good, but Black 95 shows good timing. Instead of White 96, I would attack the black group on the bottom with White 1 in Dia. 8. My idea is the same as that of Rin Kaiho. With the sequence from Black 2 to 8, this group would be almost alive, but then White attacks with 9 or 'a'.



Dia. 8

I don't know if Takemiya would play this way; he might show more fighting spirit by playing Black 2 in Dia. 9. White would force with 5 and 7, then attack the big black group with 9. Black's group would then find itself in


a life-or-death struggle. For a sequence like this to happen is utterly beyond my comprehension, but it is worth considering.



Dia. 9

A: Is White 96 the right direction?

K: Well, in fact it is very difficult. Maybe it would also be possible to play White 1 in Dia. 10. White's group would live with 7 and 9, and he would then descend to 11. After Black defends his cutting point with 12, White would attack the group with 13 and 15. It looks like a really powerful attack. White could then aim at 'a' and attack two groups at the same time.



Dia. 10

A: But White is also attacking powerfully in the game. White robs Black's group of its eyes with 100 and, in response to Black 101

and 103, White connects his four stones with 104. White is going to punish this black group.

K: Yes, this ko is so convoluted. White has a good ko threat at 106. Is Black 107 defending his group? In response to Black 109 White continues to attack with 110. Hmm, it's quite severe. This ko fight will continue forever; it's going to be a splendid game.

Figure 5 (111-171). Takemiya's secret weapon

A: The ko is going on for a long time. White 24 is clearly a ko threat, but does White have enough?

K: He is calm; he must have calculated that he will win this ko fight, maybe. But that ko threat may be problematic. I would want to push at White 1 in Dia. 11 and keep fighting the ko. White 7 and the following moves would also be ko threats, so White would not easily lose the ko fight.





Figure 5 (111-171)

14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69: take ko

K: There is one more move I question: the connection of White 28. Black 33 is unquestionably a ko threat, so if White were to play 28 at 34, Black would have a hard time finding a good ko threat. Until more moves are played and the result is displayed clearly, it is difficult to say anything definitive about these moves, but if White loses this game, White 24 and 28 may very well be the losing moves.


A: In response to White 46, Takemiya stopped playing.



Dia. 11

6, 11: take ko

K: What is he thinking about? Even if Black were to resolve the ko, White 47 would end the game immediately, right? Oh, I see. It is certainly reasonable to consider Black 1 in Dia. 12. Next, Black 3 becomes a good ko threat. When White extends at 6, this black group is already alive, so Black can end the ko fight. Wait! The loss of his territory on the right side is so big that even if Black wins it, it is not good for Black. OK, Black is considering whether White 52 is a ko threat. In a situation like this, if you can pause for a while, it means that you are doing well.



Dia. 12


5: takes ko

A: Black spent one hour and four minutes on Black 47.

K: Maybe Black has concluded that he is winning. Huh, Black answered White 52 with 53!? This is not the right scenario? With that, Black is not going to have enough ko threats.

A: That means that Black should have resolved the ko instead of Black 53?

K: Yes, it would have been good to end the ko fight with Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 13. In response to White 4, Black 5 and 7 would be resilient. White could take away the eyes of this black corner group with 8 and 10, but Black would have a tesuji at 15. When Black connects at 17, he would win by over ten points. Instead of 16, if White should play at 17, Black would cut at 'a'. I thought Takemiya read this sequence out. [Takemiya later said that he read out this sequence, but he discovered an easier way to win the game.]



Dia. 13

A: Black 67 looks like a strange move. If White ends the ko fight, what is Black going to do?

K: Oh, I see. Black found this ko threat. It is an *ishi-no-shita* tesuji. If White were to end the ko by playing at 11, the sequence Black 70–White A–Black B would take all the white stones after losing only four black ones. Takemiya probably found the *ishi-no-shita* tesuji when he was thinking about Black 47.

A: It is rare to see an *ishi-no-shita* tesuji in a real game.

K: Maybe that's why Kobayashi Meijin did not see it. When Black takes the ko with 69, it is still a ko fight, but instead of ending this ko at Black 71, he can now end it at Black C; that

will be extremely good for Black. White doesn't have any big ko threats left.

A: If White 70 is the only choice, Black finishes this ko with 71. This is tantamount to winning the ko without a loss.

K: Black had a secret weapon.

Figure 6 (172–253). *The perfect finish; three games in a row for Takemiya*

A: When I see Kobayashi Meijin on the TV monitor, his face seems to imply that the game isn't over yet.

K: Yes, he does give that impression. Maybe it's a close game. Black 77 may irritate White.

A: You knew it; White played 78. When White plays 84, are these black stones lost without compensation?

K: Maybe Black has lost a little. Why don't I calculate the territories? [After a while] I can't tell exactly.




Figure 6 (172–253)

A: Another half-point game?

K: Maybe so . . . Wait, it shouldn't be. It looks as if Black has lost these stones without any compensation. But cutting at 91 and 93 is big. I also calculated the two marked white stones as four points, but Black is easily going to get three or four additional points besides these two white stones. Consequently, Black is ahead by about 10 points on the board.

A: Some people argue that Takemiya is good at the endgame; others say he is bad at it.

K: He is certainly not bad. Rather than saying he is good, we should say that he is strong at the endgame. Takemiya knows that when a certain shape is made, he is not going to suffer a loss. A sequence such as Black 77 and the following is an example; another is Black 97. His thinking is very logical, so he does not make mistakes.

A: In the end, he finished the game nicely.

K: Because of his dubious move at 140, White's position got worse, but Kobayashi Meijin was probably looking for a place to resign.

A: This is a big victory for Takemiya, isn't it?

K: His winning the first and second games by half-point margins has something to do with luck, but he completely prevailed in this game, gaining and keeping the momentum. After the sealed move, his game was very appealing. His moves are filled with energy. I should be careful about a prediction for the next game, but I would not be surprised if he wins again.

Black resigns after 253 moves.

(Igo Club, December 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

Game Four

White: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on October 4–5, 1995, in Sendai.

Commentary by Sakai Takeshi 9-dan.

The following is from a public commentary by Sakai Takeshi 9-dan, given at the Nihon Ki-in on the evening of the second day of this game.

Sakai: 'The challenger has won three games in a row. What impresses me is that Takemiya has been playing thickly and calmly. Kobayashi Meijin always took the lead in the first half of the games in this match, but in the latter part Takemiya caught up. The pattern in this game was somewhat the same.'

Kobayashi has been making mistakes which he never made a few years ago when he was dominating many of the top titles. What has caused this condition? Perhaps

fighting as a top player for a long period of time, fatigue has accumulated just like metal fatigue in a machine. Anyway, at this crucial stage, Kobayashi must have wanted to turn the tide of this best-of-seven match to gain some momentum.




Figure 1 (1-30)

Figure 1 (1-30).

Sakai: 'Usually 6 is played at 10 as a wedge between the two black corner positions, so, playing on the side star point below 10 with Black 7 would be normal. But Kobayashi does not like to compete in the establishment of moyo and he tries to disperse his stones throughout the board.'

Kobayashi has played Black 9 in a low position. I have never seen him play high in such positions. Black plays 11, extending from both sides of his star-point stone in the top right corner.

Sakai: 'The sequence from Black 15 to 23 is often seen. White 24 is the best move; it is also big. Black's invasion at 25 is well-timed: he wants to see how White will respond.'

When Black expands his moyo with 27, White erases it with a shoulder hit at 28.

Figure 2 (31-56). Takemiya's and Kobayashi's styles

Instead of Black 31, O Rissei 9-dan argued for Black 1 in *Dia. 1*. It looks like a convincing idea, but . . .

Sakai: 'Kobayashi probably didn't like the sequence from White 2 which would make Black 1 a useless move. What surprised me

more was White 32. This move is typical of Takemiya's style: it looks very slow, but it is adequate for the position.'






Figure 2 (31-56)

Dia. 2 shows the same position. White played at 'a'. This slow move attracted the attention of the professionals watching the game. Kobayashi Satoru Kisei also questioned White 32. Sakai recommends that White play around 'b'.




Dia. 1

Sakai: 'I suppose that Takemiya believed that he had a viable game when he took the final big point at 34. Black, on the other hand, surrounded a large piece of territory on the right side with an ideal placement at 39. It certainly looks *ideal*, but *ideal* sometimes contains an element of danger.'



Dia. 2

With his thickness well established with 32 and 36, White plays at 40 to intimidate the black group on the left. Black scrambles to make eyes for this group starting with 41. Before playing Black 47 and 49, Kobayashi makes a forcing move at 45: this is Kobayashi's style.



Dia. 3

Sakai: 'Without this forcing move, there is a possibility that White may not answer it later but push out with White 8 in Dia. 3. Kobayashi worries about forcing moves being transformed into non-forcing moves.'

With White 32 and Black 45, both players display their unique styles of go.

Figure 3 (57-85). Takemiya misjudges the position.

Black settles his group on the bottom left

with 63. Later, Black can play C as a forcing move after the exchange of Black A for White B.

The scene of battle now switches to the top left corner with White 64.





Figure 3 (57-85)

Sakai: 'White is beginning to build territory in the center when he plays 72. I knew he would play that way; that is his natural tendency. Some people argued that instead of 68, White should play at 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. This way, White can get sente to invade at 7. It is important for both players to play on the right side first: White wanting to play at 7 and Black at 'a'. Yet Takemiya did not play this subtle technique.'



Dia. 4



The post-mortem discussion after the third game. Rin Kaiho seems to be pointing out something to the delight of Takemiya.

White 76 was the sealed move. Just before that, the exchange of White 74 for Black 75 attracted some attention. Sakai's explanation was that White has an aim there with the sequence White D-Black E-White F. Right now these moves are impossible, but this *aji* restricts Black from playing freely in the center from this group. However, cutting with Black at 74 to forstall this *aji* will allow White to squeeze, so the cut is not worth playing. White 74 erases the *aji* and induces Black to play 75. Black can now easily move into the center.

Sakai: 'I was surprised to see White 74. After this, I examined various possibilities, but I couldn't see any outcome which would be favorable for White.'

According to Otake: 'Takemiya must have thought that White was in the lead after 74, so he misjudged the real situation.'

A position which favors Black has turned into one in which Black is clearly ahead. It certainly looks like White could have readily made the center into his territory without that exchange.

Sakai: 'In response to Black 77, the combi-

nation of White 78 and 80 is a clever tesuji. In order to minimize the loss caused by Black 77, Black has to play Black 81 and 83, which are not desirable moves.'

After Black 85, White G is fairly big, but the sequence Black H-White I-Black J-White K would follow, and Black would then take the big point at L, so Black takes a small lead.




Figure 4 (86-108)


Figure 4 (86–108). *The climax*

Takemiya has to do something quickly, so he resolutely invades at 86, hoping to change the tide of this game.


Sakai: 'This is the climax. This is where Black feels uncomfortable about how many points he is going to lose. Who will ultimately take the lead depends on what will happen at this point.'

On the big board Sakai demonstrated various possibilities while the audience was watching, sitting on the edge of their seats. The following are some examples:

Instead of White 88, White 1 in *Dia. 5* would invite a strong black counterattack with 2 and 4. This would not work.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Black 89 is the strongest response. It intends to make White 88 a total loss. Black 1 in *Dia. 6* is what White hopes for. White 6 is a calm move, resulting in the collapse of Black's position. Black's response at 8, instead of 1, would also be good for White when he answers at 1.


Instead of White 90, White 1 in *Dia. 7* would be too aggressive. Hence, White 90 and 92 are the appropriate moves.

If Black wedges in with 1 in *Dia. 8* in response to White 92, the sequence to Black 9 would follow, and the white group would link up at 10.

The moves from Black 93 are inevitable. White 100 at 103 leaves a painful atari at Black 100. In the end, White was able split up the black stones when he played 104. Nevertheless...



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Figure 5 (109–154)

Figure 5 (109–154). *Playing safely to reach the goal*


From the viewpoint of amateurs, it looks like White has done a good job, but this is not completely true.

Otake: 'On balance, the result seems to be roughly even. White does not seem to have gained anything extra.'

Immediately after this, Black can play at 1 in *Dia. 9* and then snip off a white stone with 3 and 5; Black would not be dissatisfied. Black has lost 15 points, but he has reduced White's bottom right corner. In addition, Black has gained the thickness of the two marked stones in the center, and he still has sente.

Sakai: 'From this point on Kobayashi's

play changes: he starts playing securely, maybe because he realizes that he has a clear lead. Once Kobayashi sees that he has a lead, he begins to go awry. In this title match, he lost the first three games pursuing this pattern.'




Dia. 9

After playing Black 11 and 13, Kobayashi captured a stone at 15. However, Black should capture it without playing 11 and 13. This is an example of his cautiousness.

Sakai: 'Kobayashi must have thought that playing Black 1 in Dia. 10, instead of Black 11, followed by 3, trapping the four white stones, would have left bad aji and would not have been safe.'

Instead, Black chooses a safer way to capture them, with Black 25 and 27.



Dia. 10

Sakai: 'White 42 doesn't seem to change the balance of territories very much. Couldn't he invade at A? Well, maybe that's impossible. Black plays 45 to clinch the game. Black 49 is also an excessively safe move. Territorially, Black B is bigger.'

Sakai: 'Even though the lead is becoming slim, Black has some leeway. His victory by 8 points on the board is exactly as I predicted.'

Figure 6 (155–200), Figure 7 (201–245). Is a thrilling fightback ahead?

Now that Kobayashi has won a game, he still has hope of retaining his title. Everyone hopes that he will put up a good fight in the next game and not lose his title by a lopsided score. An exciting fightback would be a thrilling event for go fans everywhere. But if Kobayashi loses the next game, this victory will become meaningless. If he wins the next one, it could well lead to a miraculous recovery.




Figure 6 (155–200)

Kobayashi Izumi 1-dan, the daughter of Kobayashi Meijin, always comes by and peeks at her father's games here on the big board during the public commentaries. She looked worried. When I said to her, 'If he wins three more games, he will defend the title, won't he?', she gave me a sweet smile. She is always concerned about her father.

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, December 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)




Figure 7 (201-245)

8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 31, 34: take ko
(around 5); 44: connects (at 5)

Game Five

White: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Black: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on October 25-26, 1995, at the All Japan Airlines Hotel in Tokyo.

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-31)

Figure 1 (1-31). Both players stubbornly play their own styles

The moves to Black 23 were exactly the same as in the third game. White 24 is a creation of Ko-

bayashi. Black countered it by playing on the outside with 27 and 31. This is the usual Takemiya style.

As the commentator of this game for NHK Satellite TV, I was able to observe the game for two days in the press room with the referee, Kudo Norio 9-dan. A game on which a title might be decided provides its own heavy and serious atmosphere. Both players, of course, are tense, but the observers, who should be relaxed, can't help but be affected by the serious mood of the contestants. It is always painful to watch a change in a title holder.

Against Takemiya's *sanren-sei* at the top, Kobayashi always plays a *niren-sei*. In response to White 6, Takemiya played a three-space high pincer with 7, just as he did in games one and three of this series. In fact, the moves to Black 23 are exactly the same as the third game except for the orientation of the stones. Both players are very stubborn; their unwillingness to alter their moves is also part of their fighting spirits.

From White 24, this game took a different course. I question White's moves after this. Even though White plays four moves around here, he doesn't gain much, while Black blocks his access to the center with Black 31. In effect, I don't think White played very well around here.




Figure 2 (31-69)


Figure 2 (31-69). The new Takemiya style

The fight in the upper left corner ended with

Black 55. White reduced the size of Black's moyo with 56 and 58. I then saw a new facet of Takemiya's go with his moves at 59, 61, and 63.

Since Black has blocked White's escape route into the center with 31, White tries to make good shape with the moves from 32. In response to 35, White attaches at 36, aiming to make eye shape for his group. He then hopes to move out at A. Black prevents this by playing 43, so White sacrifices three stones and squeezes with 52 and 54 in sente. It looks like White has accomplished something, but the black corner stones are very thick as a result of capturing three white stones. Likewise, the atari of Black 41 is painful for White because it leaves Black with a severe tesuji at B (which he later plays with 93).


In the third game, Kobayashi played as in *Dia. 1*. He ended with sente and started to move with the marked white stone in the figure. In this game, he can't do this because Black's thickness here is greater than in *Dia. 1*, with the stones at 31 and 43 in place.



Instead of White 28 in *Figure 1*, wouldn't White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, which are similar to *Dia. 1*, be better? Moreover, I would never be able to play atari at White 54. This move is typical of Kobayashi's style: playing forcing moves instead of leaving *aji*. In *Dia. 3*, White can atari at 'a' anytime he wants. Therefore, White should leave the situation as it is and leave open the possibility of playing 'b' or 'c'.

If White didn't play the atari at 'a', Black would not have a strong counterattack. Black's only aim is at 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 4*, but when White recaptures the ko, the six black stones are in atari. Black would not readily risk this ko. If a situation arose where Black could fight this ko, that would be the time to atari at 54. It is inconceivable that this atari

would not become a forcing move later.



6: takes ko

In this series, Takemiya has played very steadily, which is a new facet of his go. But more significantly, he has displayed 'realism', showing that the Takemiya style is changing.

The combination of Black 59 and 61, Black 63, and Black 65 in response to White 64 are examples of this realism. Originally, Takemiya never liked to fix or settle shape; rather, he preferred to leave open various possibilities from the early stages of his games (the direct opposite of Kobayashi's way of playing). Moreover, Takemiya disliked placing his stones in a low position. Yet, he fixed the shape in the lower right corner with 59 and 61, then played forcing moves at 65 and 67, followed by 69, on the second line. Of course, he must have determined that his game was viable with these moves. He also must have been confident about his ability to prevail in the endgame. But the moves from Black 59 to 63 emphasize territory: realistic moves. In the past, Takemiya was always idealistic on the board. Well, in fact, he still is, but his idealism is now tempered by realism. I think it is permissible to say that a new Takemiya style, which is based in 'idealism' with some 'realism' added, has been born.

Figure 3 (70-106). The start of a life-and-death struggle

Ignoring small details, the sequence from White 70 to Black 87 is an even result. On the left side, starting from White 100, a life-and-death struggle begins.

Kobayashi spent about an hour before playing the marked stone (White 60 in *Figure 2*). He must have considered the many variations that would have resulted by a hane on the outside with 61 instead, but he concluded

that by playing the marked stone, he would have a viable game, hoping to imminently invade at White 70. Kobayashi, of course, had no thought of wiping out the entire black territory there — all he was trying to do was reduce it a bit; that would be enough. Up to Black 87, there are places where other moves might have been played with the same result, but the moves seem to be following Kobayashi's analysis.





Figure 3 (70-106)



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

Some readers might wonder why White doesn't play 84 at 87? I wonder, too. I would then expect the sequence in *Dia. 5*. Next, if Black captures the four white stones by playing at 'a', it would clearly be better for White than in the game. But Kobayashi is very cautious and he momentarily become worried.

After White captures at 7, Kobayashi was probably afraid that Black might attack his fragile position at 'b' instead of playing 'a'. However, White 'a' would still be a big move because the marked stone in *Dia. 5* has a lot of *aji*. If White followed this sequence, I think Black would still play at 'a' after White 7.


Black 91 was the sealed move.

Jumping to White 92 is a big move.

Black 93 is the move Black has been aiming at. White responds by simply connecting at 94. If it were me, I would first exchange White 1 for Black 2 in *Dia. 6*, then connect at White 3. Next, I would patiently answer Black 4 with White 5 and look forward to the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c' or a peep at White 'd'. If Black did not play Black 4, a wedge at White 'e' would be left as White's aim.

Now Black can play 97 and 99. After this, even if White plays 100 at 103, Black is not going to answer it at 100, but at 102, unlike *Dia. 6*. Still, before Black 99, he should have exchanged Black A for White B, then White's counterattack from White 100 would not have been possible.

If White played 100 at 1 in *Dia. 7*, the moves to Black 10 — which aims at Black 'a' — would follow. This would be troublesome for White. Consequently, Kobayashi initiated the fight from White 100.



Dia. 7

Figure 4 (107-124). Has Black collapsed?

An unavoidable capturing race has developed on the left side, and the combination of White 16

and 18 is splendid. It looks as if the game is over for Black, but . . .

In this figure Kobayashi's reading was clearly superior. Takemiya must have thought that he had lost everything, and Kobayashi must have been excited about victory in this game.

Look at the position. Even though Black gets a *ponnuki* in the center with 23, all of his stones on the left side are nearly lost. It was obvious to everyone that this outcome was not in Takemiya's plan. In the middle of this fight, White's cut at 16 followed by White 18 were a brilliant combination.





Figure 4 (107-124)




Dia. 8

Dia. 9

Dia. 8 shows exactly the position after

Black 15 in the Figure. The seven white stones on the side have four liberties; the four black stones above them have five. Hence, White has to capture the two marked black stones within four moves. What would happen if White simply attached at 1? If Black plays 2, followed by a connection at 4, White 5 will be satisfactory. It looks as if Black is going to win the capturing race — four liberties vs. four liberties and it is Black's turn. But when White connects at 7, White 'a' and 'b' become *miai*. However, instead of Black 4, Black will play a brilliant move at 1 in Dia. 9. After Black 11, Black 'a' and 'b' become *miai*. You can now see why White's moves at 16 and 18 are brilliant.

After White plays 22, Black can't push through with 1 and 3 in Dia. 10. White would squeeze with 4 and 6, and after White 8, Black 'a' is followed by White 'b': White wins the capturing race. Even if Black tried to snatch the white stones by playing 'c', White would be safe after playing at 'd'.



Dia. 10

7: connects

As I said earlier, Kobayashi's reading in this position was deeper than Takemiya's, and Takemiya couldn't stop castigating himself because of it. From the TV monitor, Takemiya's face showed self-scorn, cynically laughing at himself. Yet his resilience emerges from this point on, and this is another manifestation of the new Takemiya. Even though he has all but thrown away this game, he carefully seeks out counter moves. It is this attitude that brings him victory.



Takemiya becomes the new Meijin after dethroning Kobayashi Koichi, who held this title for seven consecutive terms. On the right is Kudo Norio, who joined in the post-game analysis.

Figure 5 (125–139). *Undreamed of*

In the previous figure, both players thought the game was over. Kobayashi continued assuming this, but Takemiya was beginning to see some dim lights of a revival.





Figure 5 (125–139)

Kobayashi has maintained his ability of not losing a won game. Yet that ability has become less sharp recently. This fact does not strictly refer to this series; in these past two years, the sharpness of this ability has noticeably decreased. Kobayashi himself denies it, but I think that it is a fact, and the loss of this ability has been brought about by the accumulated fatigue of playing in so many title matches. Evidence is shown in this game: after brilliantly reading out the fight in the bottom left, Kobayashi was not careful enough to counter the moves from Black 25 correctly. When his skill was at its height, he never became careless as he did in this situation. This is not meant to take anything away from Takemiya. It is admirable that Takemiya was resilient enough to find the moves from Black 25. From here it looks as if Black is setting the stage to resign. Yet, when Kobayashi was in top form, he would be very cautious about his response in this kind of a situation.

When Black played 35, Kobayashi must have become depressed after he read out this capturing race again. After Black 35, White can no longer win the race. 'I never thought such a capturing race would have happened. I was very careless,' Kobayashi said after the game. But it was too late for him to rectify his mistake.

Black 25 was the move where Kobayashi should have settled down and read the capturing race again. The losing move was White 26. White should have played at 1 in *Dia. 11* instead. Black has to play 2, and the result is at least even for White.

Black 4, by the way, is a good move. White 5 is now necessary. If White omits this move, Black plays the sequence Black 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c', and White finds himself short of liberties. If Black plays 4 at 'd', White will connect at 'c' and White has a big end-game tesuji at 'e'.




Dia. 11

By racking his brain, Takemiya came up with Black 35. If Black simply started a capturing race with 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black would lose it.


If White plays A in response to Black 35, Black would fill a liberty at 36 — the white group has one liberty less as opposed to the capturing race in *Dia. 12* — so Black would win.

If White were to change course by playing at 1 in *Dia. 13* instead of White 38, Black would still win. Unlike *Dia. 12*, Black would have one extra liberty at 13. With all of these variations in mind, White played at 38, but...



Dia. 12

14: above 12



Dia. 13

Figure 6 (140–181). Different starting positions
White has no chance to win. I assume that Kobayashi realized this when he read out the position. Still, this was a game worthy of a change in title holders.




Figure 6 (140–181)


51, 57: takes ko left of 44; 54: takes ko at 44;
62: takes ko at 46; 65: takes ko below 46;
67: connects at 46

I would like to add some further explanations to the capturing race. Instead of 38, White could have tried 1 in *Dia. 14*, then made life with 3 and 5. However, Black could start a ko fight with 6 and, having innumerable ko threats, would win it. Black could even an-

swer the ko threats at White 13 and 19. However, White doesn't have any appropriate ko threats left, while Black still has ko threats next to Black 10 and at 'a'. In the end, White would have to take the points 'b' and 'c'. But the loss of giving Black both a *ponnuki* at the marked stone and the two marked white stones would find White behind.

In response to White 40, Black jumped to 41 and, from Black 49, Takemiya finished the game beautifully by nicely handling the ko. Black has an abundance of ko threats, but with 67, he ends the ko fight as a declaration of the victory.

The moves after White 68 are such that Kobayashi was setting the stage to resign. After Black 81, the big white group has only four liberties, but each of the two black groups has five liberties, so Black wins even if White fills in a liberty for each of them at A or B.




Dia. 14

12, 15, 18, 21, 24: takes ko at 6;
23: captures three stones above 16

I would like to mention one more thing. Rather than White 42, White could have played at 1, 3, and 5, followed by 7, in Dia. 15, to reduce the black group at the top to one eye. Unfortunately for White, this would still not work. The ensuing capturing race is just one example, but this race leads to an unavoidable ko fight which is favorable for Black because of his numerous ko threats at 'a', etc. Neither the capturing race against a black group on the left side nor at the top would be workable.

The position is very interesting.



Dia. 15

18: connects at 15

White resigns after Black 181.

(Kido, December 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

After the game, I attended a banquet at which both Kobayashi and Takemiya were present. Kobayashi, without showing his disappointment at losing his long-held Meijin title, told me, 'I still have the energy and will power to win titles. You can be sure that I will be in there competing not only for the Meijin title but for the other titles as well.'

There is no doubt that Kobayashi will be a major force to contend with in the Japanese tournament scene in the years to come. He is relatively young (43 years old) and he is still in his prime. Indeed, he is now challenging Ryu Shikun for the Tengen title, and he has made a good start in the Meijin league by beating his main rival, Cho Chikun, in the first round. He is undoubtedly determined to get a return match with Takemiya next year.


On the other hand, there is a sense of excitement at having Takemiya back as a holder of a major title. Nobody can imitate his unique 'cosmic' style of go. It is a hard style to play successfully and it is proof of his genius that he has won so many titles playing this style. Whoever becomes the Meijin challenger, go fans all over the world can expect to see some exciting games in next year's title match.

New Moves and New Josekis

by Abe Yoshiteru 9-dan

An ordinary-looking new move


The game in the figure below was played on January 20th, 1995, between Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan (Black) and Yuki Satoshi 8-dan in a preliminary round of the Oza tournament.



Reference Figure

Yuki Satoshi belongs to the Kansai Ki-in. He is a promising young player and in 1995, aged 23, he played in both the Meijin and Honinbo leagues. He first entered the Honinbo league in 1993 (age 21). Kobayashi, who took the Kisei and Gosei titles this year, tends to play mild moves like Black 1.

Why is Black 1 a new move? As far as I know, this is the first time it has appeared in a professional game.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2


Dia. 1 (The departure point)

Immediately after White 4, Black enters the 3-3 point with 5. White 6 was sometimes played at 'a', but it has been rejected as infe-

rior and is no longer played. Therefore, White has no choice but to play 6.

Dia. 2 (too low)

Black's hane at 1 allows White to play 2, then to seize a stone with 6. This is not favorable for Black. Instead of 2, if White plays at 'a', the sequence Black 5-White 'b'-Black 'c' will follow. This is what Black wants.



Dia. 3


Dia. 4

Dia. 3 (Black 1: a different pattern)

Black 1 is frequently played. White's response is almost always at 'a', but 'b' is sometimes played as well.

Dia. 4 (What happened in the game: 1)

Black crawled to 1 and White played 2 and 4. Black 5 is the only move here.



Dia. 5

Dia. 6


Dia. 5 (Straight connection)

Instead of 2 in Dia. 4, White can simply connect at 1. The sequence from Black 2 to White 7 will follow. In some situations, this pattern could be very effective. White 'a' is now very big, so Black may want to play at 'b' immediately. Instead of 2, Black 'c' is not good because it leaves White with an extra liberty, unlike the position in Dia. 4.


Dia. 6 (Squeezing)

Instead of 5 in *Dia. 4*, an extension to Black 1 is not good. White immediately cuts at 2. Whether it is correct to squeeze with the moves from White 4 is another topic, but you should be aware that this possibility exists.

White 4 can be either at 12, to create thickness, or a pincer at 16.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 7 (What happened in the game: 2)


After *Dia. 4*, White pincer at 1. In response to the cap of Black 2, White descended to 3, which not only prevented Black from playing forcing moves starting at 3, but also aimed at attacking the black group in the corner. Both Black 4 and White 5 showed the players' fervent fighting spirits.

Dia. 8 (Hane and connection)

Instead of Black 2 in *Dia. 7*, Black 1 and 3 are also big. But if Black plays these forcing moves, White is not going to answer Black 'a'. If he were to answer it, though, he would do so only with 'b'.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 9 (Black's ideal result)

Instead of 3 in *Dia. 7*, if White responded at 1, Black would play 2 and 4 without hesitation. As a result, Black has forced White to


play submissively on both sides, so Black is more than satisfied.

For that reason, White played 3 in *Dia. 7*, trying to force Black to answer and to counter his plan. But Black did not cooperate.


Dia. 10 (What happened in the game: 3)

Since the black group in the corner was now without eyes, Black played 1 and 3 to give it life. Because Black didn't play 'a' or 3, but a tesuji at 1, White did not respond to Black's descent at 3.

White played a forcing move at 2, then took sente, switching to the left side with 4 and 6. White 6 is an important move. If he played 'b' instead, Black would clamp at 'c', and White's position on the left would be low.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 11 (The ladder is good for Black)

Instead of White 2 in *Dia. 10*, a hane at White 1 leads to Black 2 and 4. But this is unreasonable, since the ladder beginning at White 'a' does not work, and the two white stones will be captured.

Dia. 12 (Making life in sente)

If White played at 1 before White 4 in *Dia. 10*, Black would live up to 6 in sente and get to play on the left side first with 8. Instead of White 5, trying to kill this group with 6 would not work: Black would cut at 'a'.

Dia. 13 (What happened in the game: 4)


After the sequence in *Dia. 10*, Black cut at 1 and captured a white stone in a ladder with 3 and 5. White then went back to play at the bottom with 6, forcing Black to live. When Black captured with 13, the shape was settled.

Cutting at 3 instead of Black 1 would not be good, since it would only strengthen the upper left corner.

Dia. 14 (Black's counter move)

If Black cut at 1, instead of at 1 in *Dia. 13*, White would play 2 and 4 to get sente. He would then attack the black stones on the left side with 6. Since these three stones would not have a good way to make *sabaki*, Black's result would be bad.

Besides White 2, any direct move to counter Black 1 would not be good. For example, if White played 2 at 3, the sequence Black 'a'–White 2–Black 'b' would follow, and this would weaken the white group to the left.



Dia. 13

Dia. 14

demand. Instead of 39, approaching White 2 at Black 40 is not good as long as White holds a ladder-breaking move in reserve, which can create various forcing moves.

Figure 1B (42–71)

In order to make the most of his thickness, Black invaded at 49. But this invasion is questionable, since this thick group had to escape with 71. The black group in the corner still has a ko to worry about (White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'). White won by 1 1/2 points.




Figure 1B




Figure 1A

Figure 1A (1–41)

White 18 and Black 19 showed that both players did not want to follow the other's




Figure 2A

Figure 2A (1–19)

This is a game from the 7-dan section of the Kisei tournament played between Cho Sonjin 7-dan (Black) and Imamura Yoshiaki 7-dan.

Unlike the previous game, there was a stone of a different color in the upper left corner.




Figure 2B

Figure 2B (20-37)

White played at 20, aiming to help the white stone at the top right. Black took a big point with 23 and let the white stone escape. Black was staking this game on his center moyo. White won by resignation.




Figure 3A

Figure 3A (1-16)

This was the final game of the Ryusei title match played between Rin Kaiho (White) and Morita Michihiro 7-dan. Unlike the game between Kobayashi and Yuki, White's pincer at

19 is on the star point.

Figure 3B (17-44)

Black immediately started a fight from Black 17 and 19. Morita won by four and a half points. This was the first time he won this title.





Figure 3B


Dia. 15 (An inevitable fight)

Morita's two-step hane was severe and it will probably be the move that is played from now on. Once Black jumps out with 15, it is going to be a long fight.

Morita later said that he should not have played Black 13. Without it, a hane at Black 'a' would be a powerful move.




Dia. 15



Dia. 16

Dia. 16 (Safe)

Morita also argued that Black should play 1 and 3 if he doesn't want to start the fight with the two-step hane in Dia. 15. Even after this, however, Black can aim at a two-step hane and an invasion starting from Black 'a'.



Dia. 17

Dia. 17 (White's choice)

Instead of 12 in *Dia. 15*, White could have taken sente with White 1 in *Dia. 17*, then prevented the black stones from escaping with 3. But White must expect a severe assault on his four stones at the bottom.

(*Shinte, Shingata Nenkan '95*. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)

The 20th Gosei Title Match

Rin Kaiho vs. Kobayashi Satoru

Game Five

White: Rin Kaiho Gosei

Black: Kobayashi Satoru Kisei

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 5 hours each.

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on August 23, 1995.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru.




Figure 1 (1-11)

Figure 1 (1-11). Finally, on my fourth attempt

It was luck. I have never been anything but lucky. In terms of the quality of the games in this match, I won one game and lost four. The

only game I deserved to win was the second game in which I won with White by 9 1/2 points. When I lost the first game, I thought I wouldn't win this match, but I would do my best regardless of the result. Maybe it was this state of mind that helped me win this last game by half a point. In fact, I think Rin returned a favor to me. A year and a half ago, I lost the final game in the tournament to become the Gosei challenger to Rin. Before that, I challenged Kobayashi Koichi three years in a row and failed. This was my fourth challenge, so I am overjoyed at finally winning this title.

After playing these five games with Rin, I am reminded of how amazing his go is. He never has any bad games, not even one. My biggest discovery is that I can't see the real depth of his ability. It could be said that the depth of his go is like an abyss. More concretely, he knows a lot of things I don't. I often thought that this would be a good move, allowing me to go forward, but in reality the game was not going well for me at all. I had exactly the same experience when I played Cho in the Kisei title match. Cho also knows so many things which I don't. The scale of their games is huge. That I could sense these things has helped me immeasurably.




Figure 2 (12-24)


Figure 2 (12-24). A cap and a counterattack

Attaching with White 12 is in the right direction, and the sequence from Black 13 to 19 is a new pattern. (See the article *New Moves and New Josekis* on page xx of this issue.) Instead of Black 13, the joseki in *Dia. 1* would be possible locally, but there is no way for Black to use the marked stones in the upper left corner. Maybe the result is even, but the game would not stimulate me and I would lose interest.


The problem is how should White play after Black 19. White descended to 20. This seems to be correct in this opening. White 1 in *Dia. 2* would induce Black to play 2 and 4, then 6 and 8. Black could then aim at 'a'. It looks as if Black is making substantial gains.

Even if White played at 'b' instead of White 1, I planned on playing the forcing moves of Black 2 and 4, and making shape with Black 'c'.

In response to Black 21, a pincer at White 22 is also good. If White 1 in *Dia. 3*, Black would play the moves to 8. After this, if White 'a', Black 'b' would remain; if White 'c', Black 'd' would leave White with an unsatisfactory position.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4


After 22, jumping to 23 would give White good shape. This is why I capped at Black 23, but it was a rather emotional move, inviting a counterattack. One of the reasons I capped is that when White jumps to 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black can play at 2. With a black stone at 'a', the ladder from White 7 will not work.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 5

Considering everything, Black 1 in *Dia. 5* is probably more appropriate, isn't it? If White responds at 'a', Black 1 would have become a forcing move, so I would attach at 'b' and follow the sequence in *Dia. 3*. If White 'c', then Black would play at 'a'. Even though Black 1 does not break the ladder, if I had thought of Black 'e' as a proper response to White 'd', I would have had no hesitation playing 23 at 1.




Figure 3 (25-51)


Figure 3 (25-51). *Downwards instead of upwards*

While playing Black 25 and 27, I wondered how White would respond. In *Dia. 6*, if White played 1, Black would answer with 2 and 4. White 5 would lead to Black 6 and 8, then the cut at Black 'b' and capturing the white stones above by squeezing and setting up a ladder would become *miai*. Instead of White 5, if White played at 'a', Black would attach at 'b', inviting the atari of White 8. As a result, Black would be able to capture three stones with 6.


When I thought "That should do it!", White parried my plan with 28, 30, and 32. Splitting the white stones apart with Black 31 would not be a bad result for Black was my superficial idea, but that is not necessarily the case. This example proves the profundity of Rin's go.

Instead of playing 35, Black should have jumped at 1 in *Dia. 7*. This is a move on a grand scale. I like moves like this, but my go has been changing recently, and my stones are inclined to go downwards. White would probably at-

tack the black group with 2 (Black would counter White 'a' with a shoulder hit at 'b'). When White takes the vital point at 6, it might be painful for Black.




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Therefore, Black should play a tesuji with 3 and 5 in *Dia. 8* and sacrifice four black stones. Black 'a' is left behind as *aji*, so Black could play this way. If Black wants to put the black group in motion at the top, playing 1 in *Dia. 9*, instead of Black 35 in the game, would be better. Black could then intimidate the white corner group with 5.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

After White 40 and 42, the game became disagreeable to me. This state of mind caused me to play Black 43, which can't be considered

a move at all. This move can only be played at A. I played at 43 because if Black were to play the sequence B–White C–Black D, which had been my aim, Black 43 would be better positioned than Black A. But this thinking was redundant.

I would rather not have played at Black 45, but I couldn't come up with any other move. Finally, when the black group on the side settles down with 47, White makes a shoulder hit at 48. This is a very severe attack. Black has no choice but to play 49 in order to acquire the rhythm to play the vital point at 51.





Figure 4 (52-79)


Figure 4 (52-79). The game should have ended.

Even though the moves from White 52 to 57 look ordinary, the players were reading out a lot of variations. Instead of Black 53, Black 'A' would permit White to make a *ponnuki* at 'B'. Even if Black could escape into the center, giving White a *ponnuki* would not be good for him. In order to get a better result, Black played 53, but White 54 was an honest move.



Dia. 10


Some professionals argued for an extension at White 1 in *Dia. 10*, but in response to Black 2, White 6 would invite Black to push through and cut with Black 'a' and 4. That would be dangerous for White, so he would play a two-space jump to 3 and the sequence to White 9 would follow; Black would be far ahead. Well, this may be true, but Rin doesn't play leisurely sequences like that. Even if people say 'it's good for Black', if Rin doesn't like it, he won't play it.



Dia. 11

If White played 56 at 'A', Black would wedge in at 2 in *Dia. 11*; this would not be good for White.

When White capped at 58, I thought we were both doing pretty well, but an unexpected pitfall was waiting for me. If White answered Black 59, it would be a forcing move, but White could descend at 1 in *Dia. 12*, then cut at 3 to capture the marked black stone unconditionally. This stone would only provide Black with sente at Black 'b', and Rin would have successfully defended his Gosei title.



Dia. 12

Instead of Black 2, if Black attacked the white corner group, then White would play at 'a' and give up his corner group for the black group on the side, and White would win by a large margin.

In the game, White played twice here: at 60 and at 66. It seemed as if the goddess of luck touched the back of my neck with her cold hand. Even if White chases the black group with 64, White still has to retreat at 66. If White were to forcibly surround this black group, it would already be alive. With the sequence Black C-White D-Black E, it has one eye; it will then easily be able to make another one with Black 'F'.

Figure 5 (80-106). A typical Rin move

If I had tried to break through White's stones in the center, after Black 81, I might play a move like Black 1 in *Dia. 13*. After White 6, Black cuts at 7, and the white group on the lower left is dead. So White must play 6 at 'a', but Black extends to 'b' and has the advantage in the fighting. Therefore, White must forestall this black counterattack.

I was impressed by White 86. It is a typical Rin move: extremely flexible. If Black tries the same cut at 1 in *Dia. 14*, White 6 and 8 will capture the two black stones at 1 and 7.

In response to Black 87, White invaded the 3-3 point in the upper right corner with 88.






Figure 5 (80-106)

Black 89 at 90 would be too sweet for White territorially. Black should take the cor-

ner territory by capturing the two white stones with 97 and 99.




Dia. 13



Dia. 14

The position now is uncertain. I thought I would not lose readily, and even if I lost it would take a long time. When White extends to 102, victory will depend on how much territory White is going to make in the center.







Figure 6 (107-142)
32: connects (above 22)


Figure 6 (107-142). A close game

If I had played Black A, I could have made an eye there; this would have made my group even more secure. After White 16, Black 'A' is no longer a forcing move.



Dia. 16

From Black 17 on, the skirmish at the top contains subtle, albeit important, mistakes by both of us. First, instead of 18, White should have wedged in at 1 in Dia. 16. This would have made the white stones thicker and erased an eye of the black group next to Black 11. So 5 and 7 would give White sente.



Dia. 17

Black, on the other hand, should have cut at 1 in Dia. 17. During the game, I didn't know if Black would gain profit from this result. Yet, in discussion after the game, Rin flatly rejected my idea, saying 'There is no question that this is good for Black.'

From White 36, 40, and 42, the final fight of the game begins.

Figure 7 (143-175). Another slip

I did not have enough time to consider the position carefully; I was barely able to read out the capturing race from White 1 to Black 22 in Dia. 18: five liberties for White, six for Black.

When I played at 43, White dodged it with 44 and 46. While cutting at 47, I sensed that Black was not too bad, but without the forcing move at 58, Black 57 could have been the losing move. If I had played at 1 and 3 in Dia. 19, I could have won this game by one and a half points. With the forcing move of White 58, Rin went into the lead.






Figure 7 (143-175)



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

Being unable to make a decision about *Dia.* 17 may have a lot to do with my abilities. The ability to read is different from the ability to evaluate a position. Reading well, but not being able to evaluate cuts your abilities in half.

Figure 8 (176–200). *God must have helped me.*

During the post-mortem discussion, it was determined that if no mistakes occurred after Black 159, White would win by half a point. Black 77 and White 78 are almost like *miai*. Instead of Black 77, if Black A, followed by a white hane and black extension, it still doesn't seem like Black could win.

White 94 became the losing move. When Black played 95 and 99, the lead was reversed again. This is where Black's victory of half a point was determined. White 1 and 3 in *Dia.* 20 are bigger than they appear: they are worth five points. Black 8 is worth one and a half points, but in sente, which is equivalent to three points. The difference between the game and *Dia.* 20 is two points, and in the game White got sente, so the difference is less than two points. Anyway, in *Dia.* 20 White would win by half a point. When a game ends like this, there is no way to describe how I won except to say that God supported me. Go is a game of skill with a lot of luck thrown in.





Figure 8 (176–200)

Figure 9 (201–252). *A baptism of fire*

Recently my go has undergone a baptism of fire. I have fought against some of the great players of this era: Kobayashi Koichi, Cho



Dia. 20

Chikun, and Rin Kaiho. It seems to have changed the style of my game. I no longer put trust in thickness or moves in the center. That is why my stones tend to go downwards. Well, it is not necessarily bad that my stones end up in low positions, but I always end up with hard games. Positions seem to go from bad to worse. Well, I suppose that sooner or later I'll get used to such hardships, so I'm not particularly concerned about this problem. At the current level of my ability, I'm sure that defending the Kisei title will be very hard for me next year, whoever becomes the challenger. That is why I'm intentionally being severe on myself: to augment my go ability.

Black wins by 1/2 point.

(Kido, October 1995. Translated by Furuyama Kazunari.)




Figure 9 (201–252)


Go Proverbs That Are Always True

by Furuyama Kazunari

2. Don't Use Thickness to Make Territory!

The proverb in this issue's instalment is closely related to the one in the last issue's, which was 'Don't play close to thickness!'


First, I would like to remind you of *Principle 3* in last instalment: 'Attack your opponent's weak stones by driving them towards your own thickness'. What this principle implies is that the most efficient way to use your thickness is not to make territory around it; rather, you should attack your opponent's weak stones by driving them towards it, thus making territory in another part of the board. To put it another way, thickness is like sunshine; if you make territory around your thickness, it is like covering the ground with clouds and the sunshine of your thickness cannot penetrate; the darkness of the vampires will then descend upon the board. But when you use your thickness to drive your opponent's stones towards it, his stones will be like vampires that will turn to ashes when they are exposed to the sunshine of your thickness. The closer they approach, the more exposed they will be and the weaker they will become.



Dia. 1

Look at *Dia. 1*, which is the same as *Dia. 4* in the previous instalment. As you have already learned, it is best to attack the white stone with Black 1 in *Dia. 2*, driving it towards Black's 'iron pillar'; Black is making the most of his thickness. If White jumps to A to avoid approaching Black's thickness — it is better to do this than to play White 2 — Black may very well continue to attack it with B, keeping the white group pinned against the black thickness. As a result, Black is able to make territory


efficiently in the bottom left, and possibly later on the left side. It is a great idea to build territorial frameworks in such empty, yet potentially fruitful, places.




Dia. 2

On the other hand, for Black to make territory next to his thickness with 1 in *Dia. 3* is unacceptable. It allows White to easily settle his isolated stones by attaching with 4 in *Dia. 4*. If Black counters with the hane of 5, Black can make *sabaki* with the sequence to 12. Notice how White 10 forces Black to make an overconcentrated shape with 11. Black might try to answer White 4 with 9 or 11, but these moves are too submissive and also result in an overconcentrated shape.

The efficient way to make territory in this position is to continuously attack with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4






Figure 1

After this explanation, it should be easy for the reader to find the right attack against the lone black stone on the left side in Figure 1. However, this 1-dan player threatened it with White 1 and 3, and made territory near his thickness. As a result, Black took big points at 2 and 4, taking territory in an empty and fruitful region of the board.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White should have played 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, driving the black stone towards his thickness. With White's thickness in the background, it will be hard for Black to settle his stones here. After Black 2, White could continue to attack severely with the sequence White A–Black B–White C–Black D–White E–Black F–White–G instead of 3. Indeed, I think this is a more forceful and severe way of attacking the black stones, making them heavy

and giving Black less opportunity to make *sabaki*. But for kyu players, as long as you understand the reason why White 1 here is better than White 1 in Figure 1, and the importance of using thickness to attack, then whether you play at 3 or A is not important. After the sequence to G, White will aim to secure the lower left corner with H or I.

An often-seen mistake in this kind of situation is White 1 in Dia. 6. Compared to White 1 in Dia. 5, this move is too mild. Not only is White 1 in Dia. 6 lukewarm, but White will find it hard to build efficient territory at the bottom. After Black 2, it is too late for White to play at A. Black will not answer, but will invade at B or C. Instead of A, simply surrounding the corner territory at D does not produce as much territory as Dia. 5. In general, the more easily you allow an opponent's weak stones to settle themselves near your thickness, the harder it will be for you to make an efficient territory.





Figure 2

The next example is a game between two 1-dan players. White has just played 1 in Figure 2, trying to establish a position on the right side.

Black wanted to make use of her thickness in the center and decided to put pressure on the white group with the moves to Black 11 in Dia. 7 to make territory in the center. Unfortunately, Black did not understand the most effective way to use her thickness in the center in conjunction with her thick positions above and below these white stones. Her moves

were as sweet as honey. After Black 11, White can readily reduce Black's seemingly big territory with A and B. Moreover, in the process of reducing it, he will also get some territory at the top, so Black's territory in the center is much smaller than it looks. This is a common occurrence: your opponent reduces your territory while increasing his own.



To make the most of the thickness in Figure 2, it is best for Black to keep the white group from getting a base by playing the moves from 1 to 5 in Dia. 8. Indeed, since the white stones are completely isolated, and since Black's great thickness is lying in wait for them, it is quite likely that she will be able to annihilate them. Only in this way will her thickness work most efficiently. It may sound cruel to wipe them out, but White's original invasion on the right side was an overplay. Therefore, you have to punish him, so he will not insult other go players by irrationally invading their territories in his other games.

When you have thickness, you should play aggressively. Only then will you be able to make the most of your thickness and efficiently generate territory.

Now look at Figure 3, which is Dia. 17 in the last issue's instalment. As we saw, Black tried to make territory on the left side, thinking that building territory there was a good way to use his thickness. As you can see, unlike Dia. 2, Black does not have a target to attack, so he cannot drive his opponent's weak stones directly towards his thickness.





Figure 3

However, Black can make the most of this thickness with Black 1 to 5 in Dia. 9. This combination would be an overplay in ordinary situations, but playing these moves here is worth more than 120%, meaning that you are making the most of your thickness. Black may quite possibly secure his territory at the top without A, so in contrast to the territory produced around his thickness in Figure 3, this emerging territory will be made more efficiently, not to mention that Black will probably also be able to make satisfactory territory on the right side by attacking the white group at the top. All these territorial possibilities result from Black's thickness on the left side.



Dia. 9




Figure 4

Being unaware of this concept, Black continued to flagrantly violate the proverb and tried to make territory around his thickness in Figure 4. When White played 7, Black panicked, thinking he was going to lose his 'big' territory in the left center, so he fought back with 8 and 10 to prevent White from making further incursions.

After White 13, Black persisted in defending his territory with 14 and 16, but the harder he tried to maintain his territory there, the worse the situation became. After the sequence White A-Black B-White C, the black group at the top was in serious trouble. It would have been much better to strengthen this group with Black D instead of 8, then make territory on the right side while attacking the white group in the center right.






Figure 5

Finally, I would like to demonstrate briefly the way to make the most of White's thickness in Figure 5 (Dia. 13 in the previous instalment).

When Black plays 1 in Figure 5, the sequence from White 1 to 7 in Dia. 10 immediately comes to mind.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

In contrast, if White tries to make territory around his thickness by playing 1 in Dia. 11, he allows Black to defend at A. Black could also invade at B, making *miai* of C and D. If White separates B and the marked stone by attaching with E, Black can invade at D and regard the marked stone as light; that is, he is willing to sacrifice it.

I will show you another mistake that amateurs often make. Black 4 to 18 is a common handicap joseki. White next caps at 19. Where do you think Black should play next?







Figure 6



Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

I have often seen amateurs play 1 in *Dia. 12* so as to make territory. White will play 2, nudging Black to play another move at 3. But if you are aware that White has the sequence from White 1 to Black 4, which can be followed by White A—Black B—White C—Black D in *Dia. 13*, then it is clear that Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12* result in an extremely overconcentrated shape and the barest minimum of territory.

The correct way for Black to answer the cap of 19 in *Figure 6* is to play 1 in *Dia. 14*, aiming at A to force White in the direction of

his thickness. However, many weaker players are afraid of White B. But there is no need to worry about this move. Black can hane at C and, after White cuts with D, draw back to E. With Black's gigantic thickness in the background, White can't fight around here. If White plays F in answer to Black 1, Black can cut through at G.

In conclusion, once you have acquired the habit of playing an attacking move like 1 in *Dia. 14*, instead of a defensive move like 1 in *Dia. 12*, the way you look at go will change dramatically.

Reprints of two long out-of-print books from the Ishi Press Elementary Series. Now available from Kiseido.

IN THE BEGINNING

The Opening in the Game of Go

by Ishigure Ikuro 9-dan

The ideal introductory book on opening theory (fuseki).

US price: \$10.00 (plus \$2.25 s/h)

TESUJI

by James Davies

Contains more than 200 problems and examples to help you spot the right tactical moves in your games.

US price: \$12.00 (plus \$2.25 s/h)

Order from

North America: Kiseido, 454 Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, CA 94903-3618;

Tel: 415-499-1543; e-mail: kiseido@crl.com

Europe: Shaak en Gowinkel het Paard, Haarlemmerdijk 147, 1013 KH Amsterdam, Holland; Tel: +31-20-624-1171; FAX: +31-20-627-0885

Direct from Japan: Kiseido Publishing Company, CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan;


FAX +81-467-57-3066; e-mail: SGT00076@niftyserve.or.jp

VISA and MC accepted. Include number and expiry date with your order.

An Introduction to Tesuji (iv)


Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan

This series for novice players covers all the basic tesujis that you are likely to encounter in your games in easy-to-understand positions. This fourth instalment is about tesujis for linking up your stones. First, try solving the three problems given below. Answers and other examples are given starting on the next page.




Problem 1. Black to play

Can you utilize the marked stone to link up Black's two groups in the corner and on the left?



Problem 2. Black to play

Black has a tesuji that will enable him to link up his marked stone with his three stones in the corner.



Problem 3. Black to play


White has cut with the marked stone. Can Black link up his three stones above with those in the center?

Important Stones and Useless Stones

by Takagi Shoichi

As we mentioned in our previous instalments, even useless stones are not without value. Moreover, a position may have two or more useless stones, and their values differ depending on the position, so you do not want their *aji* to disappear by setting these stones in motion too early in the game.

In the diagram below, Black makes a double approach move with 1; the sequence to White 8 is a well-known joseki. Black next plays 9 to 14. This sequence has become a fashionable fuseki in recent years. The problem now is how to handle the 'useless' black stones at 1 and 3. Each of these stones has value, but their values differ. Which one is more valuable? Answer and analysis start on page 61.



Problem


An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Tesuji for Linking up Stones

Linking up your stones is an important middle-game technique. It often happens that you have a group that is unable to live, but you have a strong group nearby. By linking up with this strong group, you can rescue the endangered group.

Problem 1. Linking up on the first line

Sometimes, when the conditions are right, you can find an almost magical move that will enable you to link up on the first line. Problem 1 is such an example.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

Dia. 1. The tesuji

Black 1 is really a slick move. Once this move is played, there is no way for White to prevent Black from linking up his groups.

Dia. 2. The cut is useless

Against the cut of White 1, Black descends to 2. Now White cannot play 3 at 4 because he is short of liberties. Therefore White retreats to 3 and Black links up with 4.



Dia. 3


Dia. 4

Dia. 3. One or the other

If White ataris with 1, Black connects at 2. If White connects at 'b', Black ataris at 'a'; if White 'a', Black links up with 'b'.

Dia. 4. A four-space separation

In this position, there is a wide four-space separation between the two black groups. A link-up between more widely separated groups would not be possible. What is the move that Black must play to link up his stones?



Dia. 5


Dia. 6

Dia. 5. The large knight's move

Black makes a large knight's move from his group on the right. It is only because of the presence of the marked black stone that this move works. You should confirm for yourself that no matter how White plays, he cannot keep the two black groups separated.

Dia. 6. Failure

Even though it is played on the first line, the small knight's move fails to link up the black groups. White attaches with 2 and 4; there is now no way for Black to link up.



Dia. 7


Dia. 8

Dia. 7. A capturing race

Black wants to link up his three stones on the left to his group in the corner. Black should start a capturing race in which White would find himself short of liberties? What are Black's next two moves?

Dia. 8. The diagonal move

The diagonal move is the tesuji. White has no choice but to connect at 2, allowing Black to link up with 3.




Dia. 9

Dia. 9. Black wins the capturing race


If White resists by blocking at 2, Black cuts at 3, starting a capturing race. White loses this race because he is short of liberties.

Problem 2. Linking up on the second and third lines

In this problem there are two ways to link up, but one of them is vastly inferior to the other. You must find the best way.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 1. The diagonal attachment


The diagonal attachment of Black 1 is the correct answer. White has no choice but to connect at 2. Black then links up with 3.

Dia. 2. Captured

If White descends to 2 in answer to 1, Black cuts at 3 and the two white stones will be captured.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 3. A vulgar move


Black 1 is a vulgar move. White builds thickness with 2 and 4; the marked black stone has become a wasted move.

Dia. 4. The black stones die.

Black 1 might seem like a tesuji, but White neatly separates the black stones with the moves to 6. If Black now persists in trying to save his stones by descending to 'a', White will capture all the black stones in the top right corner.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 5. An overplay


Black 1 looks like a strong move, but a ko results when White ataris at 6. Therefore, it is much better for White to play the moves in Dia. 1.

Dia. 6. An application

Here is a similar position. This time the tesuji is on the second line. In answer to Black 1, White must connect at 'a', so Black links up with 'b'.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 7. A related pattern


Black's marked stone is far away from the group he wants to link up with in the corner. However, Black has a nice tesuji that can link up.

Dia. 8. Failure

Cutting with Black 1 fails. White ataris with 2 and descends to 4, separating Black's stones.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Dia. 9. Ko


The hane of Black 1 results in a ko after White 2 and 4. If Black tried to fight the ko by cutting at 'a', his loss would be enormous if he failed to win it.

Dia. 10. Correct answer

The knight's move of Black 1 is the correct answer. Because Black is threatening to cut at 'a', there is no way for White to resist.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 11. Clear


White has no choice but to connect with 1. When Black plays 2, his link-up is assured.

Dia. 12. Application


The shape here is a bit different, but the knight's move of Black 1 is the right move. If White exchanges 'a' for Black 'b', it reverts to the position in Dia. 10. If White bumps into the black stone with 'c', Black extends to 'd'.

Problem 3. Sacrifices

Sometimes it is necessary to sacrifice a stone (or stones) in order to link up groups. This problem shows an example.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 1. Failure


Directly aiming to capture the marked stone with 1 immediately fails. An atari at 2 with 1 also fails: White would answer 2 at 1.

Dia. 2. The tesuji

Cutting at 1 is the tesuji. White has to capture both the marked stone and the one at 1 if he is to keep the black groups separated. Next —



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 3. Captured


If White ataris at 2, Black double ataris with 3 and captures the pivotal marked stone. White can't play at 'a' because he is short of liberties.

Dia. 4. Variation

If White ataris from the other side with 2, Black captures the marked stone with 3. So whether White plays 1 in Dia. 3 or 1 in Dia. 4, Black can link up his stones.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 5. Application

White is threatening to play 'a' or 'b', separating the three black stones on the right from the ones on the left. How can Black link up these two groups?

Dia. 6. The tesuji


Wedging in with Black 1 is the tesuji. If White ataris with 2, Black links up with 3 and 5.

Dia. 7. Sacrifice

White can answer Black 1 by cutting at 2. In this case, Black will sacrifice his three stones


above by playing 3 and 5. All of Black's stones are now connected.

(Let's Go, April 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)



Dia. 7


Important Stones and Useless Stones



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. White is happy.


If you think that the stone at 3 in the problem diagram is more valuable, you might want to play at 1. But White would be happy to capture the other one with 2, making White's stones very thick; the two black stones above them are now heavy.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Trying to utilize a useless stone

Some players might atari with Black 1, trying to utilize the useless stone below. However, when White captures with 2, it is hard to see how Black can repair his defective shape against White's thick position. If Black descends to 3, White will invade at 4. Black has a terrible position.




Dia. 3

6: takes ko (above 3)

Dia. 3. Black is heavy.

Normally, the atari of Black 1 would be a strong move, but in this position it is dubious. After 7, Black is heavy. White could next invade as in *Dia. 2*, but White would be satisfied just playing at 8.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Unreasonable


If playing on the outside leads to a bad result, what about descending to the edge of the board with 1? White will play 2, and Black's only alternative is to crawl along the edge of the board with 3 and 5. Black might escape by linking up to his three stones above, but this is completely unreasonable because of the thickness White gets on the outside.

Dia. 5. A simple extension


Any move that Black makes with his useless stones ends in a bad result for him, so it is best for Black to simply extend to 1. White 2 is the proper response. Although Black 1 doesn't directly put the useless stones into play, it does force White to respond. Finally, Black 'a' in this position would be the height of foolishness.

Dia. 6. White plays elsewhere

If White fails to respond to Black's extension at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black will descend to 1 and play the sequence to 7. Black must defend at 8, but the attachment at 'a' becomes a strong forcing move — the 'useless' black stone below 8 is being utilized with maximum efficiency.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 7. Not small


In response to Black 1, White might play 2 so as to capture the black stone in a ladder. Black would turn at 3, linking up to his stones below; the profit Black makes here is not small. Moreover, Black might gain some additional advantage by threatening to break the ladder with a move in the top right part of the board.

Dia. 8. Bad for Black

After playing the marked stone, the atari of Black 1 is not good. Of the two useless stones, White captures the stone of greater value.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8


In summary, when you have two or more useless stones, it is important that you determine their relative values. You should next play a preparatory move, aiming to exploit their *aji*, and then save the stone of higher value.

Dia. 9. A current joseki

The sequence to White 9 is a joseki that is in fashion these days. It is similar to the joseki in the problem diagram. Instead of 9, White 'a' is also played, but White 9 is by far the most popular move. Either way, the two black stones above cannot be considered important stones.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10


Dia. 10. Terrible

Trying to escape with 1 is really terrible for Black. After exchanging 2 for Black 3, White captures with 4, making a thick position, while leaving Black's three stones floating without a base.


Dia. 11. A strong move?

What about connecting with Black 1? Is this a strong move?

This results in a position just as bad for Black as *Dia. 10*. After the sequence to Black 9, White descends to 10, linking up all his stones. Again Black is left with heavy stones floating in the center without a base.



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

Dia. 12. Extend first!


The correct way for Black to play is first to extend with the marked stone. Later, Black can exploit the *aji* of his useless stones by playing 1 and 3.

Dia. 13. Which stones should you save?

In the position below, White has ataried with 1. This move also threatens to capture five black stones above. How should Black respond?




Dia. 13




Dia. 14

Dia. 14. Ponnuki

The first impulse of many players would be to jump to Black 1, saving the five stones. But White would get a ponnuki with 2, and the three important black stones on the left are seriously endangered. This would be a big loss for Black.



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

Dia. 15. One stone is bigger than five.

Black should extend to 1, even though White captures five black stones with 2. Next, Black plays 3 to capture the isolated white stone. (If the ladder is in Black's favor, he could also capture at 'a'.) The difference between this diagram and *Dia. 14* is huge.

Remember, whether stones are important or useless is not determined by their numbers. It is better to rescue one important stone than to save five or even ten stones that are useless.


After Black 3, what about White 'a'?

Dia. 16. No escape

White can't escape by extending to 1. Black captures him in a loose ladder with the sequence to 8.


(*Igo Club*, April 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich.)

Ten Easy Problems: Answers




Problem 1

Black 1 on the 2-1 point is the tesuji. Black's stones in the corner are now invulnerable and White has no move to save his three stones.




Problem 2

Wedging in with Black 1 is the tesuji. After Black 3, White can't save his three stones.




Problem 3

Black should atari with 1 and squeeze with 3. The white stones in the corner are now dead.




Problem 4

Black defends his four stones at the top with 1 while attacking White's two stones. After Black 3, there is no escape for White.




Problem 5

Black throws in with 1. If White resists with 2 and 4, Black 5 should convince White to stop all resistance.




Problem 6

Black has to be careful of the cut at 'a'. For that reason he cannot defend with 'b': White will cut at 'a'. Black 1 effectively captures the two white stones on the right.




Problem 7

4: connects at 1
Throwing in with 1 is the tesuji. White can't capture at 3 because of a snapback, so he captures with 2. After Black 5, White finds himself without a response.




Problem 8

Black clamps with 1 and links up with 3. The four white stones on the right are now dead.



Problem 9

Black throws in with 1 and, after Black 3, White finds himself short of liberties.



Problem 10

4: connects at 1
Throwing in at 1 and the atari of 3 leave White short of liberties. After Black 5, the white stones are clearly dead.

FANTASTIC SAVINGS ON ISHI PRESS GO BOOKS

The Ishi Press in Japan is having an inventory clearance sale. Until March 31, 1996, the following books can be purchased direct from Japan at wholesale prices:

Basic Techniques of Go by Nagahara and Haruyama . . .	\$9.00
Strategic Concepts of Go by Nagahara	\$9.00
The Endgame by Ogawa and Davies	\$9.00
Handicap Go by Nagahara and Bozulich	\$9.00
Kage's Secret Chronicles of Handicap Go by Kageyama .	\$8.00
Dictionary of Basic Joseki, Vol. 2 by Ishida Yoshio . . .	\$15.00
Dictionary of Basic Joseki, Vol. 3 by Ishida Yoshio . . .	\$15.00
Appreciating Famous Games by Ohira Shuzo	\$9.00
The Go Player's Almanac edited by Bozulich	\$25.00
The 3-3 Point: Modern Opening Strategy by Cho Chikun	\$9.00
Go World back issues 37, 38, 40—56, 58—68:	\$4.00@
Price for issues earlier than 37 (1, 14, 20, 30, 33, 34 only):	\$7.00@

Order from:

The Ishi Press, Inc.

CPO BOX 2126, Tokyo, Japan

FAX+81-467-57-3066; e-mail: SGT00076@niftyserve.or.jp

Offer valid only in North America. Add 15% for s/h.

VISA & MC accepted.

Please give number and expiry date of your card.

A new software product that could make you three stones stronger

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE AND DEATH

by Cho Chikun Honinbo

The most comprehensive collection of life-and-death problems ever assembled in any format. On one floppy disk, 2,878 problems are presented for the user to solve. The problems are divided into five categories:

Beginner — suitable for players who have just learned the rules and are getting started. Contains 200 problems on capturing and rescuing stones.

Elementary — for players from 10- to 25-kyu. Contains 922 problems.

Intermediate — for players from 1-kyu to 10-kyu. Contains 935 problems

Advanced — for players 1-dan and stronger. Contains 793 problems

Strange Positions — contains 28 strange and interesting problems that have been handed down from ancient China and Japan. They are all difficult, but even if you can't solve them, you will find it entertaining to see the computer play out the solutions on the screen. These problems have become part of the folklore of go.

This is an extremely user-friendly product. There is a **study-trial** mode where you can study the problem on screen, trying out candidate moves. When you think you have the solution, you can switch to the test mode.

In the **test mode** you are given 10 problems. You set your time allowance, and within that time you enter your solution. The computer tells you if the move entered is correct or not and moves on to the next problem of the series. When you finish, you are given a score for the set and you can go back and try the ones you missed again.

Then there is the **solution mode** where the computer automatically plays out the solution at a pre-set speed. In this mode, the computer will display the solution forward or backwards, fast or slow. The computer will also display the main variations.

This is, without doubt, the most useful go-problem software that has yet been produced. There are so many problems to choose from, at all levels of difficulty, that this software will appeal to all go players. If you are a beginner, just master one set of 10 problems every day, and in about six months your reading ability will have advanced to that of a dan player.

In the US, order from: **Kiseido**, 454 Gallinas Ave., #255, San Rafael, California 94903-3618; Tel: 415-499-1543; e-mail: kiseido@crl.com

In Europe, order from **Schaak en Gowinkel het Paard** Haarlemmerdijk 147, Amsterdam, Holland. Tel: +31-20-624-1171; FAX: 31-20-627-0885

In other countries, order from: **Kiseido Publishing Company**, CPO Box 2126, Tokyo; FAX +81-467-57-3066; e-mail: SGT00076@niftyserve.or.jp

Now available. Price: \$60 plus \$3 s/h or ¥6,300 plus ¥500 s/h (from Japan).